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WHEN SECRECY THREATENS SECURITY: EDMONDS V.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND A PROPOSAL TO REFORM THE
STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
Anthony Rapa ∗
[T]he Appellate judges asked my attorneys and me (the plaintiff) to leave
the courtroom, so that the government attorneys could secretly answer questions and make their argument. The guards escorted us, the plaintiff, out,
locked the doors, and stood there in front of the courtroom and watched us
for about fifteen minutes. So much for finally having my day in court; here
I was, with my attorneys, standing outside the courtroom and being
guarded, while in there, three judges were having a cozy mingling session
with a large troop of government attorneys. Then, it was over; that was it;
we were told to leave. In other words, my attorneys and I were barred from
being present in our own court hearing, and my case remained covered up
1
and gagged . . . .

INTRODUCTION
2

Somewhere between the designations of “patriot” and “night3
mare” lies the truth about Sibel Edmonds. Somewhere between lies
either one of the more troubling untold stories of the investigation of
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1
Sibel
Edmonds,
Gagged,
but
Not
Dead
(May
14,
2005),
http://www.justacitizen.com/articles_documents/
May14-05-Gagged%20but%20not%20Dead.htm [hereinafter Edmonds, Gagged, but
Not Dead].
2
David Rose, An Inconvenient Patriot, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 2005, at 264, 264; Press
Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Sibel Edmonds v. Department of Justice: A
Patriot Silenced, Fighting to Keep America Safe (Sept. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Edmonds Press Release 1], http://informationclearinghouse.info/article9774.htm.
3
Christopher Deliso, An Interview with Sibel Edmonds, ANTIWAR.COM, July 1, 2004,
http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=2917 (“[O]ne of the top guys . . . called
me a ‘nightmare.’”).
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4

the September 11 attacks, or a hoax. Yet Edmonds’ tale remains im5
prisoned by multiple gag orders and, more pertinent to this Com6
ment, the state secrets evidence privilege.
Edmonds is a former FBI contract linguist who sued the Bureau,
alleging that she was terminated for blowing the whistle on rampant
7
corruption and espionage in the Bureau translation department.
She claims she approached her superiors with allegations of more
than just garden variety malfeasance in her department—specifically,
infiltration of the department by organized crime and foreign intelligence, as well as distortion and misdirection of the September 11 in8
vestigation and other terrorism probes. An investigative journalist,
culling sources from each rung of the FBI and Department of Justice
ladder that Edmonds visited in raising her complaints, has argued
that the case intersects with ongoing investigations of illegal payments
9
allegedly made to members of Congress.
10
Despite mainstream media coverage of Edmonds’ story, the at11
tention of Congressmen and Senators, and the intervention of the
12
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Edmonds has yet to have a
4
See, e.g., Eric Boehlert, We Should Have Had Orange or Red-Type of Alert in June or
July of 2001, SALON.COM, March 26, 2004, http://www.salon.com/news/
feature/2004/03/26/translator/index_np.html.
5
Scott Horton, Cracking the Case: An Interview with Sibel Edmonds, ANTIWAR.COM,
Aug. 22, 2005, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/horton.php?articleid=7032 (“I have
several gag orders. In fact, based on the research that my attorneys, the ACLU, has
[sic] conducted, I am the most gagged person in United States history . . . .”).
6
Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d,
161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005).
7
Complaint, Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004)
(No. 02-1448) [hereinafter Edmonds 2002 Complaint], available at
http://www.thememoryhole.org/spy/edmonds.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2005).
8
See id; Complaint at ¶¶ 4–5, Edmonds v. United States, No. 1:05CV00540
(D.D.C. March 16, 2005) [hereinafter Edmonds 2005 Complaint], available at
http://www.justacitizen.com/articles_documents/Final-SFX503-Mar16-05.pdf.
9
Rose, supra note 2, at 281.
10
See Eric Lichtblau, Whistleblowing Said to Be Factor in FBI Firing, N.Y. TIMES, July
29, 2004, at A1; Paula Zahn Now (CNN television broadcast Jan. 14, 2005), transcript
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0501/14/pzn.01.html; 60
Minutes (CBS television broadcast Aug. 8, 2004), transcript available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/25/60minutes/main526954.shtml.
11
See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Members of Congress
Pledge Support for FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds, (March 3, 2005)
[hereinafter “Edmonds Press Release 2”], http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/
SafeandFree.cfm?ID=17640&c=206; Letter from U.S. Senators Patrick Leahy and
Charles Grassley to U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft (July 9, 2004),
http://www.justacitizen.com/articles_documents/Leahy_Grassley_Letter_to_Ashcrof
t_7-9-04.pdf.
12
See Edmonds Press Release 1, supra note 2.
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day in court. That is because the Bush administration has thus far
13
prevailed in invoking the state secrets privilege, a little-known and
14
rarely deployed tool of evidence law that courts and the press alike
15
have referred to as “draconian.” The District Court for the District
of Columbia agreed with Attorney General Ashcroft’s assessment that
the procession of Edmonds’ claim would result in the disclosure of
evidence that would be harmful to national security, and dismissed
16
the action. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed in an
17
unpublished opinion. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Edmonds’
18
petition for a writ of certiorari.
19
What is the state secrets privilege? It has been described as an
evidence privilege dating back to eighteenth-century English juris20
prudence, protecting military and diplomatic secrets of the Execu21
The Supreme Court aftive in the name of the common good.
firmed its existence in 1953, holding it an absolute privilege against

13
Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d,
161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005).
14
The state secrets privilege has been invoked just over sixty times since 1953. See
William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI.
Q. 85, 101, 109 (2005) (tallying fifty-five uses of the privilege from 1953–2001 and
seven since 2001). But see William Fisher, “State Secrets” Privilege Not So Rare, INTER
PRESS
SERVICE
NEWS
AGENCY,
Aug.
15,
2005,
http://ipsnews.net/
news.asp?idnews=29902 (arguing that over sixty uses of the privilege indicates usage
is not rare).
15
In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Edmonds, 323 F. Supp.
2d at 81; Rose, supra note 2, at 266.
16
Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 81–82.
17
Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 734 (2005).
18
126 S. Ct. 734 (2005).
19
For a discussion of the state secrets privilege in the context of privileges generally, see 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE § 509 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1996); 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL AND CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 224–27 (rev. ed. 1985).
20
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 97 (describing the Trial of Maha Rajah
Nundocomar, (1775) 20 Howell’s State Trials 923 (Sup. Ct. of Judicature, Bengal)).
21
See generally United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1953); Beatson v.
Skene, (1860) 5 Hurlstone & Norman 838, 853, 157 Eng. Rep. 1415, 1421 (“[I]f the
production of a State paper would be injurious to the public service, the general
public interest must be considered paramount to the individual interest of a suitor . .
. .”); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 92 (“[T]he ultimate reason for upholding
[the privilege’s] use is . . . that it is necessary to the survival of the state.”); 2 LOUISELL
& MUELLER, supra note 19 at 961 (“The state secrets privilege is but a single instance
in a larger effort, undertaken in the interest of self preservation, to keep certain sensitive information out of the hands of persons who might sell it or use it to the injury
or detriment of the nation.”).
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22

discovery, and has not formally revisited it since. The Court did not
23
hold that the privilege was constitutionally based.
The privilege has been invoked in cases that seem to have clearly
warranted its application, such as commercial litigation involving defense contracts where sensitive documents describing secret military
24
equipment were at issue. The state secrets privilege has also reared
its head, however, in cases where plaintiffs sued the government over
25
constitutional violations or blew the whistle on government prac26
tices that allegedly threatened national security.
The growth of the national security state has required increasing
27
levels of executive secrecy and deference to that secrecy. The use of
the privilege has been on the rise, however, since the Carter admini28
stration, and the current administration has broadened the scope of
29
information over which it claims privilege. Courts and commenta-

22

Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6–7, 11.
Id. at 6 (“Both positions [urged by the parties] have constitutional overtones
which we find it unnecessary to pass upon . . . .”).
24
See, e.g., Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 397–98
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Virtual Defs. & Dev. Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Moldova, 133 F. Supp.
2d 9, 23 (D.D.C. 2000), appeal dismissed, No. 00-5427, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7468
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2001); N.S.N. Int’l Indus. v. E.I. Dupont de Numours & Co., 140
F.R.D. 275, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
25
See, e.g., Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1116-17 (8th Cir. 1995) (alleging
a violation of Fourth Amendment rights); In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 473–74
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (claiming violations stemming from FBI COINTELPRO program);
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 52–54 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (alleging a warrantless electronic surveillance in retaliation for leaking the Pentagon Papers to the press).
26
Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 69 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 161 F.
App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005); Order at 1, Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756 (D.D.C. July 28, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/jud/statesec/horn072804.pdf. See also J.F.O. McAllister, Getting in the Way of
Good Policy: A U.S. Drug Enforcer in Burma Sues His Colleagues for Scuttling His Best Efforts
to Curb Trafficking, TIME, Nov. 7, 1994, at 50 (reporting the allegations of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) whistleblower Richard Horn).
27
Note, The Military and State Secrets Privilege: Protection for the National Security or
Immunity for the Executive?, 91 YALE L.J. 570, 576 (1982) [hereinafter The Military and
State Secrets Privilege] (“In the current international setting . . . matters as diverse as
international trade, manufacturing techniques, natural resource supplies, social unrest, and even meteorological conditions can affect national security.”).
28
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 101 (“[B]etween the decision in Reynolds
and the election of Jimmy Carter, in 1976, there were four reported cases in which
the government invoked the privilege. Between 1977 and 2001, there were a total of
fifty-one reported cases in which courts ruled on invocation of the privilege.”).
29
Id. at 111. President Bush, through Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg.
56025 (2001), extended authority to invoke the state secrets privilege to former
presidents. Moreover, he has extended this authority to the Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, as well as the head of the EPA. Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 111.
23
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tors agree that the state secrets privilege is in tension with individual
30
litigants’ rights. It also clashes with notions of transparency that in31
here in a democracy.
This Comment proposes that the state secrets privilege be reformed in order to prevent executive abuses. Part I traces the history
of the privilege before 1953. Part II discusses the landmark 1953 Su32
preme Court case of United States v. Reynolds, the rule it announced
and its rationale, and brief Supreme Court treatments of Reynolds in
33
34
United States v. Nixon and Tenet v. Doe. Part III describes the lower
courts’ handling of Reynolds, assesses proposed Rule of Evidence 509,
the only congressional attempt at codifying the state secrets privilege,
and categorizes types of state secrets cases. Part IV reviews the Edmonds case and the grave implications for national security it may
hold. Finally, Part V evaluates commentators’ suggestions for reform
and proposes that where a whistleblower plaintiff alleges government
actions or omissions that have threatened or are threatening national
security, the state secrets privilege must be transformed into a qualified privilege in which the government faces a heightened standard
for successful invocation.
I.

THE HISTORY AND RATIONALE OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
35

The genesis of the state secrets privilege is not precisely known,
but English experience with a form of the privilege dates back to the
36
late eighteenth century. The Court in Reynolds described American
30
See generally 1 CHARLES MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 107 at
423 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. West Group 1999) (1954). McCormick writes:
As the activities of modern government have expanded, the need of
litigants for the disclosure and proof of documents and other information in the possession of government officials has correspondingly increased . . . . When this need is asserted and opposed, the public interest in the secrecy of “classified” information comes into direct conflict
with the public interest in the protection of the claim of the individual
to due process of law in the redress of grievances.
Id.
31
President John F. Kennedy, Address “The President and the Press” Before the
American Newspaper Publishers Association, 1 PUB. PAPERS 334 (Apr. 27, 1961)
(“The very word ‘secrecy’ is repugnant in a free and open society . . . .”); Joint AntiFascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 128, 171 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking . . . .”).
32
345 U.S. 1 (1953).
33
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
34
544 U.S. 1 (2005).
35
The Military and State Secrets Privilege, supra note 27, at 571.
36
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 97 (describing the Trial of Maha Rajah
Nundocomar, (1775) 20 State Trials 923 (Sup. Ct. of Judicature, Bengal)).
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37

experience with the privilege as “limited,” yet an American court
encountered an invocation of privilege covering military and diplo38
matic secrets at least as far back as 1807. Moreover, the Framers debated the role of secrecy in the constitutional order even earlier than
39
that. Thus the state secrets privilege, as it currently stands in American jurisprudence, can be said to spring from two sources: first, Eng40
lish common law, and second, the political debates and practices of
the Framers at the time of the Founding and the early years of the
41
republic.
A. English Common Law
An understanding of a “crown privilege” granting authority to
the monarch’s counselors and ministers to resist compulsion of secret
information dates back to Blackstone and can be found in practice in
42
Blackstone in his Commentaries exthe late eighteenth century.
plained, “[T]he duty of a Privy Counselor appears from the oath of
office, [which requires the Counselor] to keep the King’s counsel secret . . . [and] to withstand all persons who would attempt the con43
trary.” In 1775, Governor General of India Warren Hastings employed the same reasoning in instructing his secretary to refuse to
produce the books of the East India Company in the face of a judicial
request, arguing they contained secrets important to the safety of
44
The court agreed that “curious and impertinent
Great Britain.
eyes” should not have access to the materials, but was firm in admonishing that a magistrate, not a Crown official, had the final say as to
45
when evidence must be produced.

37

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953).
See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d)
(Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as Circuit Justice, held that Burr had the right to production of a letter from General Wilkinson to President Jefferson but that any elements whose exposure would threaten “public safety” would be suppressed).
39
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 94–95.
40
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–8; Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 93.
41
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 94–95.
42
Id. at 97.
43
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 230–31 (St.
George Tucker ed., 1803) (1765).
44
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 97.
45
Id. (citing the Trial of Maha Rajah Nundocomar, (1775) 20 Howell’s State Trials 923, 1057 (Sup. Ct. of Judicature, Bengal)). The court said that a magistrate has
this power “where justice shall require copies of the records and proceedings, from
the highest court of judicature, down to the court of Pie-Powder.” Id. (quoting Nundocomar, 20 Howell’s State Trials at 1057).
38
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Despite this admonition, the Crown prevailed in all reported
cases in which it claimed that keeping documents secret was in the
46
47
public interest. The holding in the 1860 case of Beatson v. Skene
sums up the approach of the British courts in the early cases broaching the subject: “[I]f the production of a State paper would be injurious to the public service, the general public interest must be considered paramount to the individual interest of a suitor in a Court of
48
justice . . . .”
Two important issues arose in the early privilege cases: first, what
form a proper objection to production should take; and second,
49
whether an assertion of privilege should be conclusive. On the first
subject, British courts came to require that a political head of a department at least personally consider documents in issue before a
subordinate raises an objection, if not physically appear to make the
50
objection himself.
On the second subject a split of authority
emerged, with one approach favoring judicial inspection of purportedly privileged materials and another calling for total deference to
51
the crown.
In 1942, the House of Lords set out the modern British state se52
crets rule in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird and Co. Lord Chancellor Viscount, writing for the majority, affirmed the requirement that a de53
partment head personally consider the materials in issue and held
that “an objection validly taken to production, on the ground that
54
this would be injurious to the public interest, is conclusive . . . .”
The court also asserted, however, that decisions concerning these
55
matters were to be made by judges, not government officials. The
court set out grounds that would not be sufficient to make an invocation of privilege valid: the mere fact that a document is marked
“state,” “official,” or “confidential”; fear of opening up a department
to criticism or parliamentary investigation; the possibility that production would require the testimony of officials who have significant
46

Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 97.
(1860) 5 Hurlstone & Norman 838, 157 Eng. Rep. 1415 (Exch.).
48
Id. at 1421.
49
Duncan v. Cammell, Laird, & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 636–37 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
50
Id. at 637–38 (citing Beatson, 157 Eng. Rep. 1415; Hennessy v. Wright, (1888)
21 Q.B.D. 509; Kain v. Farrer, (1877) 37 L.T. 469 (C.P.)).
51
Id. at 638–40 (comparing Hennessy with Beatson and others).
52
[1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.).
53
Id. at 638.
54
Id. at 642.
55
Id.
47
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duties elsewhere; and the chance that production may expose inade56
quacies within a department or expose it to liability. Lord Chancellor Viscount did not, however, explain how a court might probe a
57
department head’s motives in asserting privilege.
B. The Development of the Privilege in American Jurisprudence
Withholding information from Congress actually predates the
Founding, as the Committee of Secret Correspondence refused to
share materials with the rest of the Continental Congress, citing an
58
inability to trust a large political body with lives at stake. Later the
59
Framers debated the role secrecy should play in the republic. James
60
Wilson made the case for transparency, while Elbridge Gerry, Roger
Sherman, and John Jay favored secrecy in limited circumstances relat61
ing to “treaties and military operations.” Specifically, Jay argued:
[I]t seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties . . . but that
perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite . . .
and there doubtless are many [people] who would rely on the secrecy of the president, but who would not confide in that of the
62
Senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly.

The debate over secrecy continued into the Washington admini63
stration. In 1792, President Washington was confronted with House
efforts to investigate a Native American attack on the army, prompting the President and his advisers to consider the possibility of with64
Washington concluded that
holding information from Congress.
the President may not disclose certain papers, citing political, rather
65
than constitutional, reasons. His advisers posited that where disclosure would be injurious to the public, papers should be kept secret;
66
they did not, however, cite any authority for this position.
56

Id.
See id. at 642–43.
58
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 94.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 64 at 392 (John Jay)(Clinton Rossiter ed.
1961)).
63
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 94–95.
64
Id. at 94–95 (citing 23 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 257 (Charles T. Cullen
ed., Princeton University Press 1990) (1792) [hereinafter Jefferson Papers]). The
attack in issue was the massacre of Major General St. Clair’s army in 1791, in which
over 600 soldiers were killed.
See generally Arthur St. Clair, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_St._Clair (last modified Sept. 2, 2005).
65
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 95.
66
Id. (citing Jefferson Papers, supra note 64, at 262).
57
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In 1796, the President withheld information from Congress in
67
the face of an official request for the first time. The House had
asked to examine the instructions given to the minister to Great Brit68
69
ain relating to the Jay Treaty. Washington refused. This time he
claimed his power was based in the Constitution, reasoning that the
70
President alone had the power to make treaties.
The trial of Aaron Burr saw a key development of the state secrets privilege, judicial recognition of the need for nondisclosure
71
where disclosure of a document would be harmful to the public. At
the trial, Burr sought the production of a letter from General Wilkin72
son to President Jefferson. Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as Circuit
Justice, issued a subpoena duces tecum to Jefferson to produce the letter, but determined that any elements of the correspondence that
73
would threaten “public safety” would be suppressed.
74
In 1875, the Supreme Court decided Totten v. United States, a
case that concerned a matter closely related to the modern state secrets privilege. In Totten, the plaintiff sued for breach of contract, alleging he had entered into an agreement with President Lincoln in
which he would spy on the Confederates behind enemy lines in ex75
change for monthly payments. The Court held that where the contract in issue is one to perform “secret services,” the case must be
dismissed, as it will inevitably result in the disclosure of confidential
76
information. Determining first that the President may make such
secret agreements pursuant to his commander-in-chief powers, the
Court reasoned that the very subject matter of the case—the spy contract made between the plaintiff and President Lincoln—was an item
77
of confidential information that may never be disclosed. Therefore,
the majority reasoned, any suit brought to enforce such a contract
must be dismissed on the pleadings, as the secret information would

67

Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 95.
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. (noting that “virtually every president since has justified withholding information from Congress on the same separation of powers grounds”).
71
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d);
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 95.
72
Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 32.
73
Id. at 37.
74
92 U.S. 105 (1875).
75
Id. at 105–06.
76
Id. at 107.
77
Id. at 106–07.
68
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78

inevitably be disclosed. The Court added that dismissal is required
in cases in which confidential information that exists between a priest
and a penitent, a husband and a wife, an attorney and a client, and a
79
physician and a patient will inevitably be disclosed. The Court did
not mention, however, any protected item of confidential government
information other than a contract to perform secret services, nor did
80
it announce any general rule governing the state secrets privilege.
The proposition that certain evidence ought to be privileged in
order to protect military secrets is found in a few cases reported in
the early decades of the twentieth century. In Firth Sterling Steel Co. v.
81
Bethlehem Steel Co., the district judge held that in a commercial dispute the Navy was permitted on grounds of “public policy” to refuse
82
to furnish blueprints of armor-piercing projectiles in development.
83
In Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., a patent infringement action, the
court held that the government could intervene to claim privilege as
to the plans of certain weapons systems that the plaintiff had moved
84
the court to order produced. Finally, in Bank Line, Ltd. v. United
85
States, the Second Circuit declined to issue a writ of mandamus
where the court below had ordered the production of Navy records
relating to a ship collision in World War II, but suggested that the dis86
trict court, on remand, consider Duncan v. Cammell, Laird and Co. in
87
determining the question of privilege.
Firth and Pollen marked an evolution of the Totten rule towards
the modern state secrets privilege. In both Firth and Pollen, the suits
were allowed to proceed even though the court had held that the
88
evidence in issue was a privileged military secret. This practice of

78

Id. at 107.
Id.
80
See Totten, 92 U.S. at 107. Over a century after Totten, the Supreme Court affirmed its holding in Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005). The Court also distinguished
the Totten rule from the state secrets privilege. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 9.
81
199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912).
82
Id. at 356.
83
26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
84
Id. at 585–86 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875)) (reasoning
that peacetime decisions as to military secrecy should be left to the Executive).
85
163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947).
86
[1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
87
Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, 138–39 (2d Cir. 1949).
88
See Pollen, 26 F. Supp. at 586 (denying motion to compel discovery, but not
dismissing case); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353, 356
(E.D. Penn. 1912) (same). The Pollen case was litigated until 1940, while Firth was
litigated until 1915. See Pollen, 108 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1940); Firth, 216 F. 755 (D. Pa.
1914), rev’d, 224 F. 937 (2d Cir. 1915).
79
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severing privileged evidence and allowing a case to continue was distinguishable from the Totten situation in which a case must be dismissed where it could not proceed without disclosure of confidential
89
information.
II. THE REYNOLDS RULE AND ITS RATIONALE
90

In United States v. Reynolds, decided in 1953, the Supreme Court
for the first time addressed whether the government could invoke a
privilege as to certain evidence where it claimed disclosure would be
91
harmful to the public. The plaintiffs had sued the government under the Tort Claims Act after their husbands, civilian observers
aboard an Air Force B-29 bomber, were killed when the plane
92
crashed.
The plaintiffs moved the district court to compel production of
the official Air Force accident report, and the court granted the mo93
tion. The Secretary of the Air Force then sent a letter to the court
stating that the report could not be furnished because it would be
94
against the “public interest.” The court permitted a rehearing on
the matter, where the Secretary filed a formal “Claim of Privilege” in
which he stated that the bomber had been on a “highly secret mis95
sion” the day of the crash. Moreover, the Judge Advocate General
of the Air Force filed an affidavit in which he contended that disclosure of the report would threaten national security and offered to
“produce the three surviving crew members, without cost, for exami96
nation by the plaintiffs.” In response to the “Claim of Privilege” and
the affidavits, the court ordered the Air Force to submit the report
for its examination so that it could determine whether the document
97
98
should be privileged. The government refused. The court then
ordered that all facts alleged on the plaintiffs’ claim of negligence be
99
established in their favor.

89

Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
345 U.S. 1 (1953).
91
See id. at 7 (“Judicial experience with the privilege which protects military and
state secrets has been limited in this country.”).
92
Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
93
Id. at 469, 471–72.
94
Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir. 1951).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 990–91.
98
Id. at 991.
99
Id.
90
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A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
100
affirmed.
The court first held that such a claim of privilege presented a justiciable question, governed by the laws of evidence upon
101
submission of the materials in issue in camera. Moreover, the panel
held that to permit the government to conclusively determine the
status of its own claim of privilege was to unconstitutionally “abdicate
102
the judicial function.”
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded by a vote of six to
103
three.
Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the majority, first declined
to address the case on constitutional grounds, despite the briefs of
104
The Court observed that
both sides urging the Court to do so.
American courts had not had much experience with an evidence
privilege protecting military secrets, but noted that such a privilege
105
was well-established at English common law. The majority cited the
106
British case Duncan v. Cammell, Laird and Co., Ltd. in demonstrating
the existence of the privilege in England and relied upon it in formu107
lating its holding on the American state secrets privilege.
The Court announced a set of procedural requirements and a
standard of review for cases in which the government invokes the
108
privilege to protect military secrets.
Only the government may as109
sert the privilege, and it may not be waived by private individuals.
110
Only a department head may in“It is not to be lightly invoked.”
voke the privilege, and only after personally reviewing the materials

100

Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 998 (3d Cir. 1951).
Id. at 997.
102
Id.
103
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953). Justices Black, Frankfurter,
and Jackson dissented. Id.
104
Id. at 6. For an argument that the Reynolds decision may have been in fact constitutionally based, see 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, at 509–20.
105
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
106
[1942] A.C. 624, 636-37; see supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text.
107
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8 nn.15 & 20–22. It has been argued that the Court’s reliance on Duncan was “improvident” given that separation of powers has a decidedly
less prominent role in British governance and that Duncan, like Reynolds, was a response to a military exigency, World War II. Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 99–
100. The Third Circuit in Reynolds distinguished Duncan by noting the differences
between American and British notions of separation of powers. Reynolds, 192 F.2d at
997 (“[W]hatever may be true in Great Britain the Government of the United States
is one of checks and balances.”) (footnote omitted).
108
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–11.
109
Id. at 7.
110
Id.
101
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111

in issue.
It is incumbent upon the court to determine whether the
materials should be privileged, but it should not do so through a
practice that forces disclosure of the very evidence for which the gov112
Yet the majority asserted that final auernment asserts privilege.
113
thority rests with the court, “not the caprice of executive officers.”
The Court held that the government will prevail on an invocation of
privilege to protect military secrets wherever it can demonstrate “a
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be
114
divulged.” Unlike other executive privileges, the state secrets privilege is absolute: no showing of a litigant’s necessity can overcome an
invocation that meets the standard above, and necessity will only be
considered in determining the extent to which a court need review
115
Thus, where a
the merits of the government’s claim of privilege.
litigant demonstrates great need for the evidence, an invocation of
116
privilege “should not be lightly accepted”; where such need seems
lacking, however, the assertion of a department head may be conclu117
sive.
The Court thus outlined how a state secrets dispute should play
out before a district court. In response to a discovery request, a department head may file a formal claim of privilege stating that, after
personal consideration, he or she has determined that production
118
presents a reasonable danger that a military secret will be divulged.
Where the litigant’s need for the evidence is dubious, the claim of
119
privilege will be conclusive.
Where there is greater need, a court

111

Id. at 7–8. The Court did not elaborate on which executive officers are “department head[s],” nor did it describe just what form a proper invocation should
take. In calling for a “department head” to claim privilege, the majority cited the
Duncan requirement that he or she be the “political head of the department.” Id. at 8
n.20 (quoting Duncan, [1942] A.C. at 638) (emphasis added). Since the invocation
of the Secretary of the Air Force was sufficient in this case, the standard apparently
does not require a Cabinet-level officer. As for the proper form of an invocation, the
Court called only for a “formal claim of privilege . . . lodged . . . after actual personal
consideration . . . .” Id. (footnote omitted). This indicates that a claim need not be
supported by an affidavit, though it should be noted that in Reynolds the Judge Advocate General supported the Secretary’s claim with an affidavit. Id. at 4–5.
112
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8.
113
Id. at 9–10.
114
Id. at 10.
115
Id. at 11.
116
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 7–8.
119
Id. at 11.
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may probe the merits of the formal claim further, though always
with an eye towards avoiding disclosure of a military secret, even to
121
the court itself, wherever possible.
Though the Court held for the United States in Reynolds, it did
not dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim. The majority rather remanded for
further proceedings, reasoning that as the purportedly top secret
electronic equipment had no causal relation to the crash, plaintiffs
122
could still prove causation without the accident report. The majority further noted that the government had made certain “alternatives”
available to plaintiffs, such as the production of witnesses at no cost,
123
The parties
and that plaintiffs should take advantage of them.
124
eventually reached a settlement.
Why was the Court so eager to clasp to the holding of Duncan
and usher the state secrets privilege onto these shores? First, the majority noted that the time (1953) was one of “vigorous preparation for
125
Specifically, for purposes of the case at bar, the
national defense.”
Court reasoned that air power was vital to national defense and the
126
exposure of any secrets relating to it could be harmful. Finally, the
Court distinguished the case from criminal cases, where the government must dismiss the charges against a defendant if it asserts privi127
Chief Justice
lege over evidence material to the accused’s defense.
Vinson reasoned that in the instant case the government was the defendant and the non-moving party (i.e., party not seeking privileged
128
material) and was thus fully within its rights to assert the privilege.
At the time, Reynolds fit neatly into what is the generally accepted
129
rationale for the role of privileges in evidence law.
Wigmore lists
four conditions that must be met in order for a privilege to arise:
120

Id.
Id. at 10 (“[T]he court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is
meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the
judge alone, in chambers.”).
122
Id. at 10.
123
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11–12.
124
Herring v. United States, No. 03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 1909 (2006).
125
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
126
Id. at 10.
127
Id. at 12.
128
Id.
129
For a discussion of privilege, see generally GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JOSEPH P.
KINNEARY, WEISSENBURGER’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 501 (3d ed. 1998); 2 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 19, ¶¶ 501–13; 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, §§ 200–49;
1 MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 30, §§ 72–143.
121
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(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be discussed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered;
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
130
for the correct disposal of litigation.

Any effort to protect military secrets and diplomatic secrets,
which the Supreme Court later stated was included in the state se131
crets privilege, easily satisfies these first three conditions. Yet one
can argue that in certain cases the state secrets privilege does not satisfy Wigmore’s fourth condition; that is, the injury of disclosure is not
greater than the benefit the evidence provides to the litigant, because
it is possible that a plaintiff simply cannot proceed without such evi132
dence, while disclosure may only cause embarrassment at worst.
But the Court in Reynolds correctly cast the potential injury as a public
133
injury, while the benefit to be gained was only private.
Thus, the
facts of the case actually dictate that the disposition be an easy one:
on one side, the private litigants suffered a tragic loss but were really
only three tort plaintiffs suing over a plane crash, while on the other
side top-secret military equipment at the height of the Cold War was
at stake. According to this reasoning, however, the calculus should
change where the moving party can demonstrate that a public interest
in disclosure outweighs the interest in non-disclosure that the government asserts.
Recently declassified documents indicate that Reynolds itself may
demonstrate everything wrong with the state secrets privilege. The
documents reveal that the B-29 in fact was not carrying any secret
134
After declassification, relatives of the Reyelectronic equipment.
nolds plaintiffs sought to set aside the settlement reached in 1953, arguing that the Secretary of the Air Force perpetrated a fraud upon

130

WEISSENBERGER & KINNEARY, supra note 129, § 501.3 (citing 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
131
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 618, 706 (1974).
132
See infra Part IV.
133
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10–11 (discussing the respective importance of potential
danger to national security and a litigant’s need for evidence).
134
Herring v. United States, No. 03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 1909 (2006); see also Barry Siegel, The Secret of the B-29, L.A. TIMES, April 18,
2004, at A1.
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the court in violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, reasoning
that no fraud was committed since, while no secret equipment was on
board, the accident report contained details of the workings of a B-29
136
that could have been beneficial to enemy intelligence in 1953.
The Supreme Court has never revisited Reynolds, but its brief encounters with the case in 1974 and 2005 indicate that it is still good
137
law. In United States v. Nixon, decided in 1974, the Court distinguished a President’s generalized interest in the confidentiality of his
internal communications from his need to protect military and diplomatic secrets, reasoning that production of communications of the
former sort for in camera examination does not harm him in the way
138
that production of the latter sort of communications does. In 2005,
the Court cited Reynolds in unanimously reaffirming the Totten rule in
139
the case of Tenet v. Doe.
The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
holding that Reynolds had replaced Totten, reasoning that Reynolds
deals with a question of evidence while Totten calls for dismissal on
the pleadings of certain claims that never even reach the issue of evi140
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s treatment of Reynolds indicates
dence.
141
that the Court does not see any issue as to its continuing viability.

135

Herring, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, at *6–7; FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
Herring, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, at *19–21, 26–30, 37. The court took the
“mosaic” approach to the state secrets privilege described infra at notes 149–151 and
accompanying text. This formed part of the basis of the Third Circuit’s affirmance
of the case. See Herring, 424 F.3d at 391 n.3.
137
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
138
Id. at 706. The Court, while not describing exactly how in camera inspection of
purported state secrets would hurt the President, seemed to reach this conclusion on
separation-of-powers grounds. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, noted
that “[a]s to these areas of Art. II duties the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities.” Id. at 710. The Court then quoted C
& S Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948):
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ
for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are
not and ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and
perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly
held secret.
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710.
139
544 U.S. 1 (2005).
140
Id. at 9. The Court described the Totten rule as “a rule designed not merely to
defeat the asserted claims, but to preclude judicial inquiry,” a threshold issue similar
to the prudential standing doctrine. Id. at 6.
141
Id. at 9 (discussing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)).
136

RAPAFINAL.DOC

2006]

10/20/2006 11:48:35 AM

COMMENT
III.

249

LOWER COURTS’ HANDLING OF REYNOLDS AND
PROPOSED RULE 509

A. Scope of Privilege, Procedure, and Effects of a Successful Invocation
Lower courts have done well in determining the scope of information protected by the state secrets privilege. They have struggled,
however, in hammering out the proper procedures Reynolds requires
and in judging just what a successful invocation of the privilege
means to a case.
In general, courts have taken an expansive view of what consti142
tutes a state secret.
Taking their cue from the Supreme Court’s
143
dicta in Nixon, lower courts have adopted the position that secrets
relating to diplomatic relations, as well as military secrets, are pro144
tected by the state secrets privilege. Moreover, secrets having to do
145
Thus, courts
with intelligence-gathering techniques are protected.
are in agreement that the government may assert a privilege over any
evidence, the disclosure of which will injure national security.
Courts vary as to the extent of judicial review they require when
the privilege is invoked. Some courts are quick to dismiss after a
146
proper invocation, while others are more demanding of the Execu147
tive.
142

J. Steven Gardner, The State Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation: Proposal for
Statutory Relief, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567, 584–85 (1994). An example of the privilege’s seemingly endless expansion can be found in Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595 (3d
Cir. 1990), where the Attorney General invoked the privilege to protect an FBI file
maintained on a sixth grader who received mail from foreign countries as part of a
school project. Id. at 600.
143
Compare Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 710 (emphasizing the President’s need to protect military and diplomatic secrets) with Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6–7, 10-11 (discussing
the importance of protecting military secrets).
144
See, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
145
See, e.g., Halkin v. Helms (“Halkin I”), 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
146
See Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1995); Zuckerbraun v.
General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547–48 (2d Cir. 1994); Bowles v. United
States, 950 F.2d 154, 156 (4th Cir. 1991).
147
See, e.g., Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 59 (“When a litigant must lose if the claim is upheld and the government’s assertions are dubious in view of the nature of the information requested and the circumstances surrounding the case, careful in camera examination is not only appropriate, but obligatory.”) (citations omitted).
[I]n situations in which close examination of the government’s assertions is warranted, the trial judge should insist (1) that the formal
claim of privilege be made on the public record and (2) that the government either (a) publicly explain in detail the kinds of injury to national security it seeks to avoid and the reason those harms would result
from revelation of the requested information or (b) indicate why such
an explanation would itself endanger national security . . . . The gov-
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Often courts seem tentative in applying the standard of review
announced in Reynolds—that the government must show “a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security should not be di148
vulged.”
They have taken what two commentators refer to as the
149
“mosaic” approach to state secrets: out of fear of the impact of disclosure of even seemingly harmless, unclassified information, courts
150
cite their own lack of expertise and defer to the Executive.
These
courts reason that enemy intelligence can synthesize seemingly benign evidence and thus gain insight into the inner workings of the
151
government.
A successful invocation of the state secrets privilege removes the
privileged evidence from a case, at which point any one of three
152
things may happen. First, if a plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case without the evidence, the case will be dismissed; otherwise it
153
will continue. Second, if a defendant is deprived of evidence material to his defense, summary judgment will be granted to the defen154
dant.
Third, if the very subject matter of a case is privileged, then
155
the case will be dismissed at the pleadings.
Finally, one noteworthy aspect of lower courts’ handling of Reynolds is their broad interpretation of the requirement that department heads personally consider purportedly privileged materials.
Courts have held that, in situations requiring personal consideration
by department heads under Reynolds, executive officers may make
ernment’s public statement need be no more (and no less) specific
than is practicable under the circumstances.
Id. at 63–64 (footnote omitted).
148
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
149
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 103–04.
150
See, e.g., Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 8.
It requires little reflection to understand that the business of foreign
intelligence gathering in this age of computer technology is more akin
to the construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a cloak
and dagger affair. Thousands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous
information can be analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole must operate.
....
. . . Courts should accord the "utmost deference" to executive assertions of privilege upon grounds of military or diplomatic secrets.
Id. at 8–9 (citations omitted).
151
Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998); Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 8.
152
Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
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their determinations based on summaries or other reports made to
156
them by subordinates.
B. The Odyssey of Rule 509
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Advisory Committee for the
157
Federal Rules of Evidence proposed thirteen privilege rules, one of
158
which was Rule 509, which addressed the state secrets privilege.
The Committee sought to approximate the holding of Reynolds,
though the drafting process reveals tinkering with the standard and
159
procedures announced in that case.
156

Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., 423 F.3d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reh’g denied, No. 04-1349, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 28951, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 6, 2005) (en
banc); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 400 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
157
2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, at 501–02.
158
2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 225. For a discussion of the trek of the
original privilege rules through Congress and the ultimate adoption of Rule 501, see
2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, § 501[01].
159
Proposed Rule 509 read in pertinent part:
(a) Definitions.
(1) Secret of state.— A “secret of state” is a governmental secret relating to the national defense or the international relations of the United
States.
(2) Official information.— “Official information” is information within
the custody or control of a department or agency of the government
the disclosure of which is shown to be contrary to the public interest
and which consists of: (A) intragovernmental opinions or recommendations submitted for consideration in the performance of decisional
or policymaking functions, or (B) subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500, investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes and
not otherwise available, or (C) information within the custody or control of a governmental department or agency whether initiated within
the department or agency or acquired by it in its exercise of its official
responsibilities and not otherwise available to the public pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 552.
(b) General rule of privilege.— The government has a privilege to refuse to give evidence and to prevent any person from giving evidence
upon a showing of reasonable likelihood of danger that the evidence
will disclose a secret of state or official information, as defined in this
rule.
(c) Procedures.— The privilege for secrets of state may be claimed only
by the chief officer of the government agency or department administering the subject matter which the secret information sought concerns, but the privilege for official information may be asserted by any
attorney representing the government. The required showing may be
made in whole or in part in the form of a written statement. The judge
may hear the matter in chambers, but all counsel are entitled to inspect
the claim and showing and to be heard thereon, except that, in the
case of secrets of state, the judge upon motion of the government, may
permit the government to make the required showing in the above
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The preliminary draft of the Rule, released in 1969, called for
the privilege to be effective where there was a substantial likelihood
160
that “the evidence will disclose a secret of state.”
The 1971 draft featured a shift in this standard, now calling for a reasonable likelihood
that disclosure “will be detrimental or injurious to the national defense or the
161
international relations of the United States.”
The 1971 draft was at once more lenient and more exacting. On
the one hand, it lowered the likelihood of injury (from substantial to
reasonable) that the government needed to demonstrate. This second draft, however, also raised the standard for the type of injury the
government must demonstrate. While originally the Advisory Committee called only for the government to raise the specter of the dis162
closure of a state secret, the second draft stipulated an executive officer must raise the alarm of injury to national defense or
163
international relations.
The difference may be demonstrated by reference to Halkin v.
164
Helms (“Halkin I”).
In Halkin I, the plaintiffs argued that the state
form in camera. If the judge sustains the privilege upon a showing in
camera, the entire text of the government’s statements shall be sealed
and preserved in the court’s records in the event of appeal. In the case
of privilege claimed for official information the court may require examination in camera of the information itself. The judge may take any
protective measure which the interests of the government and the furtherance of justice may require.
(d) Notice to government.— If the circumstances of the case indicate a
substantial possibility that a claim of privilege would be appropriate but
has not been made because of oversight or lack of knowledge, the
judge shall give or cause notice to be given to the officer entitled to
claim the privilege and shall stay further proceedings a reasonable time
to afford opportunity to assert a claim of privilege.
(e) Effect of sustaining claim.— If a claim of privilege is sustained in a
proceeding to which the government is a party and it appears that another party is thereby deprived of material evidence, the judge shall
make any further orders which the interests of justice require, including striking the testimony of a witness, declaring a mistrial, finding
against the government upon an issue as to which the evidence is relevant, or dismissing the action.
FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1973), reprinted in 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 19, § 509-1-2.
160
FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1969) (emphasis added); 2 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 19, § 509-9.
161
FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1971) (emphasis added); 2 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 19, § 509-9.
162
FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1969) (emphasis added); 2 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 19, § 509-9.
163
FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1971) (emphasis added); 2 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 19, § 509-9.
164
598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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secrets privilege should not protect, without more, the mere fact that
the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted their private com165
Under the 1971 version of Rule 509, the danger that
munications.
the secret of the interceptions would be revealed would not have been
enough. The government would have had to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that disclosure of that fact would harm national security.
The Justice Department was not pleased with this develop166
ment.
It responded by proposing its own draft which, of course,
167
called for a lower standard. That proposed draft even went so far as
to call for the classification of a document to be “conclusive on the
168
issue of state secrets.”
The Advisory Committee adopted many of the Justice Department’s suggestions in the final draft of Rule 509, which the Supreme
169
Court transmitted in 1973.
In fact, both components of the standard in issue—the degree of injury and the sort of injury—were low170
ered.
Rule 509(a)(1) defined a “secret of state” as “a governmental secret relating to the national defense or the international relations of
171
the United States.” Subsection (b) set out the government’s powers
in asserting the privilege and the standard of review: “The government has a privilege to refuse to give evidence and to prevent any
person from giving evidence upon a showing of reasonable likelihood of
danger that the evidence will disclose a secret of state or official informa172
tion, as defined in this rule.” As described above, this was the double-lowering of the state secrets standard, combining the most lenient
173
This language more closely
of the 1969 and 1971 standards.
tracked the standard announced in Reynolds, which held that a show-

165

Id. at 8. The court rejected this argument. Id. at 8–9.
2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, at 945–46. The Justice Department objected to Proposed Rule 509 in part because it considered the standard of review
governing state secrets claims— a reasonable likelihood of danger that disclosure will
be detrimental to national defense or international relations—too demanding of the
government. It also objected because the Advisory Committee had denied it a muchcoveted official information privilege. Id.
167
2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, § 509-11-12.
168
Id.
169
2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, at 949–51.
170
2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, at § 509-13.
171
FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1973).
172
Id. (emphases added).
173
See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
166
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ing of a “reasonable danger” of the exposure of “military matters” was
174
sufficient.
Subsection (c) modified the Reynolds procedures. The Rule
lightened the requirement that only a department head may invoke
the state secrets privilege by giving agency heads the same author175
ity.
Gone was the stipulation that an officer must personally con176
Officers claiming the
sider the purportedly privileged materials.
privilege were permitted to make their showing in the form of a writ177
ten statement.
The judge and counsel were free to inspect this
showing and whatever else the government submitted, unless the
178
government successfully moved for in camera inspection. The judge
179
was free to take whatever protective measures were necessary.
The Committee likely made these changes in order to allow
more play in the joints, that is, to approximate the workings of modern government. It seems counter-productive to require a Cabinetlevel officer, or an agency head for that matter, to inspect documents
that may number in the thousands in order to prevail in asserting the
180
state secrets privilege.
The Advisory Committee set out an interesting new requirement
in subsection (d). The Rule mandated that
[i]f the circumstances of the case indicate a substantial possibility
that a claim of privilege would be appropriate but has not been
made because of oversight or lack of knowledge, the judge shall
give or cause notice to be given to the officer entitled to claim the
privilege and shall stay further proceedings a reasonable time to
181
afford opportunity to assert a claim of privilege.

Proposed Rule 509 imposed a requirement on judges to apprise
182
the Executive of possible disclosure of a state secret. This is notable
174

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1973).
176
See id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
See Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., 423 F.3d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reh’g
denied, No. 04-1349, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 28951, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 6, 2005) (en
banc); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 400 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
181
FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1973).
182
This requirement forms part of this Comment’s proposal set forth infra in Part
V. The proposal also features a corresponding duty on the part of either the court or
the Executive to transmit purportedly privileged materials to ranking members of
Congress with security clearances where the privilege is invoked in a national security
whistleblower case. See Infra Part V.
175
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given the line of reasoning in state secrets jurisprudence that judges
are ill-equipped to make such determinations concerning national
183
Suddenly judges were required to referee, in an area in
security.
which they were presumed to be unqualified, in order to broaden the
net of privilege claims.
184
Subsection (e) set out the effects of a successful invocation. In
a case in which the government was a party and properly invoked the
privilege, if the other party was deprived of material evidence, the
judge was free to take measures as justice required, “including striking the testimony of a witness, declaring a mistrial, finding against the
government upon an issue as to which the evidence is relevant, or
185
dismissing the action.” The Rule was silent on what a judge may do
186
where the government intervened as a third party.
Rule 509 suffered from a tragedy of timing. Though passage of
rules of evidence is ordinarily mundane fare for Congress, the Supreme Court transmitted the Federal Rules just as the Watergate
187
Scandal was exploding.
Suddenly Congress was faced with proposed codification of the state secrets and official information privileges at a time when it was headed for a showdown with the President
over the withholding of information. The privilege rules ignited a
188
debate that held up passage of the Federal Rules for two years.
Ultimately Rule 509, along with all of the privilege rules, was
189
voted down.
Congress, hostile overall to the codification of privileges, opted for a catch-all Rule 501, which provides, inter alia, that
the rules of privilege in the federal courts are to be governed by the
190
common law.
What would have been the effect of Rule 509? It has been argued that while the Rule would have promoted “the broadest possible
reading of Reynolds,” the firestorm of criticism that attended its pro191
posal was unfair.
Moreover, two commentators contend that Rule

183

See, e.g., Halkin I, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1973).
185
Id. The approach of finding against the government on an issue in which it
invokes the privilege conflicts with the approach lower courts have taken. See supra
notes 152–55 and accompanying text. This is precisely what the lower court did in
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 5 (1953).
186
See FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1973).
187
2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, at 509-3.
188
Id. (“[N]o single rule promulgated by the Supreme Court provoked as strong a
reaction– almost all of it negative– as did Rule 509.”).
189
Id. at 501-2–3.
190
See FED. R. EVID. 501.
191
2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, at 956.
184
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509 left ambiguous the same things that Reynolds left ambiguous: the
role of in camera inspection, the scope of the privilege, and the de192
The procedural modificagree of deference due the Executive.
tions were minor, though excising the requirement that department
or agency heads personally consider purportedly privileged materials
essentially guaranteed that anonymous underlings would make secrecy determinations. One major change was the obligation imposed
on trial judges to provide notice to the government where there was a
substantial possibility a state secret might be disclosed, a requirement
which certainly would have broadened use of the privilege.
The lesson to be learned from the rise and fall of Rule 509 is
that Congress can exercise a negative power to strike down an effort
to officially enshrine government secrecy privileges. Whether or not
it will exercise an active power to reform the state secrets privilege
remains to be seen. It is certainly within Congress’ purview to do
193
so, and this Comment urges that it take exactly this course of action.
C. Types of State Secrets Cases
Litigants have invoked the state secrets privilege in commercial
disputes, often with the government intervening as a third party.
These cases typically involve defense contracts or intellectual property
194
issues.

192

Id.
For an example of Congress’ exercise of this active power, see FED. R. EVID.
413–15 (setting out rules governing admissibility of similar crimes and acts in sex offense cases).
194
See Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., 423 F.3d 1260, 1262–63 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
reh’g denied, No. 04-1349, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 28951, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 6, 2005)
(en banc) (misappropriation of trade secret claim related to underwater fiber optic
cable technology); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1021–
22 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (breach of contract action over stealth bomber); DTM Research,
L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 2001) (trade secret claim over
telecommunications technology); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751
F.2d 395, 397–98 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (defense contractor sued military contractor); Clift
v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 827–28 (2d Cir. 1979) (Invention Secrecy Act action);
Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1958) (Invention Secrecy Act action); Virtual Defs. & Dev. Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Moldova, 133 F. Supp. 2d 9, 23
(D.D.C. 2000), appeal dismissed, No. 00-5427, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7468 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 15, 2001) (defense contractor claimed it was entitled to sales commission on
sale of Mig-29s); Foster v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 492, 493 (Cl. Ct. 1987) (Invention
Secrecy Act claim); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 157, 159 (Cl. Ct.
1983) (same); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1939)
(patent infringement); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353,
354 (E.D. Pa. 1912) (patent action over weapons).
193
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Two narrow areas in which the government has invoked the
privilege are employment discrimination cases and cases concerning
intelligence relationships. In some cases, the Executive has claimed
state secrets privilege where agents of certain federal agencies alleged
195
discrimination in their line of work. In other cases, involving intelligence matters, the privilege has been invoked, though resort to the
196
Totten rule may have been more appropriate.
Beginning in the 1970’s, two rather disturbing strains of state secrets cases emerged. The first is a group of cases in which plaintiffs
alleged the government violated their constitutional rights through
warrantless surveillance and other harassment. The second is a collection of cases in which plaintiffs alleged the government had
knowledge of certain sordid activities.
The surveillance cases, mostly litigated in the 1970s and 1980s,
197
dealt with some fairly high profile matters.
Daniel Ellsberg, who
198
leaked the Pentagon Papers to the press, sued the government, alleging that the Nixon administration targeted him for warrantless
199
surveillance out of reprisal. A group of plaintiffs who were involved

195

Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 341–42 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
1052 (2006); Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Sterling’s appellate brief, counsel set forth a rather searing condemnation of the state secrets privilege:
The government’s increased use of secrecy as a sword rather than a
shield has reached endemic proportions . . . . The Executive Branch,
and in particular the CIA, appears blinded by an ambition to weaken
the historical notion of separation of powers by attacking the courts’
ability to adjudicate judicial matters, both civil and criminal, that may
encroach upon national security information. That must now stop.
Appellant’s Brief at 11, Sterling, 416 F.3d 338 (footnote omitted), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/sterling1204.pdf. The court in Sterling partially based
its decision on the threat of “graymail,” a process by which a plaintiff brings an action
against an agency with the intention of getting the agency to settle out of fear of revealing classified information. Sterling, 416 F.3d at 344.
196
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1238–39 (4th Cir. 1985)
(plaintiff sued Penthouse for libel after it printed a story linking him to CIA plans to
weaponize marine mammals); Maxwell v. First Nat’l Bank of Md., 143 F.R.D. 590,
593–94 (D. Md. 1991) (plaintiff bank employee alleged life became “intolerable” after he learned a customer was really a front for a CIA money laundering operation);
Heine v. Raus, 305 F. Supp. 816, 816–17 (D. Md. 1969) (plaintiff sued after defendant “outed” him as Soviet intelligence).
197
The issue of warrantless domestic spying again rose to the forefront with the
revelation that the Bush administration green-lighted such spying by the National
Security Agency after the September 11 attacks. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush
Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
198
Daniel Ellsberg, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Ellsberg (last
visited Aug. 22, 2006).
199
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 52–53 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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in anti-Vietnam war organizations sued various agencies and officials,
including CIA Directors Helms and Colby, alleging warrantless sur200
The ACLU followed, claiming that the military spied on
veillance.
201
civilians domestically. Moreover, the government was sued over the
202
now-infamous COINTELPRO FBI program.
Another group of cases involved plaintiffs alleging government
knowledge of illicit activity as support for their various causes of ac203
tion.
An airline suing an insurance company after terrorists destroyed a plane sought to compel production of CIA documents confirming that Arab governments paid the terrorist group
204
Relatives of the deceased sued the government over
responsible.
205
the downing of an Iranian commercial aircraft by a Navy missile.
Parents sued suspected Contra operatives for the wrongful death of
their son, who was tortured and murdered while working in Nicaragua; they subpoenaed two federal agencies for documents concern206
ing the activities of the Contras at the time of the murder.
In almost all of the cases noted above, the government invoked
207
the state secrets privilege and prevailed. Though some courts were
200
Halkin v. Helms (“Halkin I”), 598 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Halkin v. Helms
(“Halkin II”), 690 F.2d 977, 980–81 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
201
ACLU v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
202
In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989). For a discussion of the
COINTELPRO program, the objective of which was to neutralize leftist groups
through infiltration and smear campaigns from 1956 to 1971, see generally Going
Undercover/Criminalizing Dissent?, NOW WITH BILL MOYERS, March 5, 2004,
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/cointelpro.html; Paul Wolf, COINTELPRO
,http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/cointel.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
Actress Jean Seberg, one of many celebrity targets of the program, blamed the miscarriage of her child on FBI harassment and ultimately committed suicide in 1979.
Jean Seberg: Politics, http://www.saintjean.co.uk/politics.htm (last visited Sept. 3,
2006). For copies of COINTELPRO documents relating to Seberg and an account of
her time targeted by the program, see id.
203
Certain aspects of the Edmonds case fall into this category. See Infra Part V.C.
204
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 368 F. Supp. 1098,
1100–01, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
205
Nejad v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 753, 754 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
206
Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 183 F.R.D. 314, 316 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d, 251
F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
207
In re United States, 872 F.2d at 481; Halkin v. Helms (“Halkin II”), 690 F.2d 977,
1001, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (partially basing its decision on the “constitutional requirement” that the needs of the litigant yield to the public interest); Halkin v.
Helms (“Halkin I”), 598 F.2d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51,
59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the district court’s blocking discovery based on the
privilege was correct “for the most part”); Linder, 183 F.R.D. at 325; Nejad, 724 F.
Supp. at 756; Pan Am. World Airways, 368 F. Supp. at 1140–41. The court in Brown
remanded to the district court for a determination as to the privilege where there
was a new trial judge on the case. ACLU v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir.
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more demanding than others, the end result was that each of these
potentially explosive cases was stalled, halted, or outright dismissed.
These cases presented a challenge to the Reynolds framework.
The surveillance cases, in particular, moved state secrets case law out
of the black-and-white workability of Reynolds itself and commercial
litigation cases, and confronted courts with the likelihood that victims
of egregious constitutional violations were remediless. For the first
time the possibility of bad faith in invoking the privilege crept into
the picture—the possibility that government officials, tangled in allegations of mass invasions of privacy and political intimidation, were
208
In fact,
crouching behind the shield of the state secrets privilege.
the D.C. Circuit found an overreach in Ellsberg v. Mitchell when the
government claimed it need not produce the names of the Attorneys
209
General who authorized the allegedly unconstitutional surveillance.
The panel, unimpressed by the conjurations of broad national secu210
rity interests, ordered the names be produced.
Bound by Supreme Court precedent, the most courts could do
in these cases was wring their hands at the mass of alleged potential
211
violations that were going by the boards.
Reynolds, with its holding
that the interests of a private litigant can never outweigh the properly
212
asserted interests of the government, forbade them from even considering that the interests of the plaintiffs in the surveillance cases
approached those of the government. Yet, it can be argued that
these plaintiffs invoked interests that equaled, or even outweighed,
the potential harm to national security that the government decried.

1980) (en banc). The court in Nat’l Lawyers Guild set out procedures to be followed
in claiming the privilege. Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390, 403
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
208
The Ellsberg affair was a prominent part of the most notorious cover-up in
modern U.S. politics, Watergate, as the first operation of the so-called “Plumbers”
was breaking into Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office. White House Plumbers, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_House_Plumbers (last visited Aug. 22, 2006).
209
Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 60.
210
Id. (“We cannot see, and the government does not even purport to explain,
how any further disruption of diplomatic relations or undesirable education of hostile intelligence analysts would result from naming the responsible officials.”). White
House counsel Charles Colson served time in prison for obstruction of justice in the
Ellsberg affair. Revisiting Watergate: Key Players: Charles Colson, WASHINGTONPOST.COM,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/watergate/charles.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2006).
211
See In re United States, 872 F.2d at 477 (calling denial of a forum without allowing a plaintiff a day in court “draconian”); Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 1001 (stating that
only Congress could provide relief to parties alleging injury from the government
“pursuing the ends of state”).
212
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
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If correct in their allegations, they were standing up against threats to
the Bill of Rights and supplying the political process with subjects for
discourse. Yet, in the ultimate evaluation the plaintiffs alleged no
government wrongdoing that directly threatened national security.
In the post-September 11th world, courts must grapple with invocations of the privilege in the context of two new areas: the war on
terror and the phenomenon of national security whistleblowers.
Perhaps most notably, the government has invoked the state secrets privilege in a number of cases in which the plaintiffs have alleged they were the targets of warrantless electronic surveillance initi213
ated by the National Security Agency. Moreover, the suit of Khalid
El-Masri, a German citizen who alleges he was abducted and “rendered” to Afghanistan for four months of torture, ran into the
214
The Global Relief Fund, a charity that
buzzsaw of the privilege.
213

The plaintiffs in the respective cases challenged the constitutionality of the socalled “terrorist surveillance program,” which the New York Times reported President
Bush authorized by secret order, a fact which the President himself confirmed in a
radio address. James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; Kelli Arena, Bush Says He Signed NSA
Wiretap
Order,
CNN.COM,
Dec.
17,
2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/
POLITICS/12/17/bush.nsa. The government invoked the privilege as an intervenor
in two of the reported cases and as a party defendant in the third. ACLU v.
NSA/Cent. Sec. Serv., No. 06-CV-10204, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57338, at *5 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 17, 2006) (party defendant); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., No. 06 C 2837, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50812, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2006) (intervenor); Hepting v. AT&T
Corp., No. C-06-672 VRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49955, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 20,
2006) (intervenor). The courts upheld the privilege as to those alleged aspects of
the program which were not made public, including alleged tracking of the phone
records of millions of Americans, but denied it as to the aspect which the government publicly disclosed, monitoring communications between suspected al Qaeda
members based in America and their cohorts abroad. See ACLU, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57338 at *24—25; Terkel, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50812, at *49–52; Hepting,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49955 at *58–62. In the ACLU case, Judge Diggs Taylor ordered an injunction against the publicly disclosed aspect of the program, reasoning
that “the public interest is clear, in this matter. It is the upholding of our Constitution.” ACLU, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57338 at *79.
214
El-Masri v. Tenet, No 1:05cv1417, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34577, at *2–7 (allegations), 17–25 (discussion of the privilege); see also Declaration of James P. Comey,
Deputy Attorney General, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No.
04-CV-0249-DGT), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/arar-notice-011805.pdf
(invocation of the privilege in reply to another rendition/torture case). The court in
Arar held the government’s state secrets claim was moot, as there were other grounds
for dismissal. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 287. For a discussion of the Arar case and the
secret “extraordinary rendition” program, see Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106. It has recently been revealed that a key feature of the
program is a network of secret prisons which the United States maintains in Eastern
Europe and Asia. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons; Debate Is Growing Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set up After 9/11, WASH.
POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A01.
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sued after the government allegedly conducted warrantless searches
215
Sibel Edmonds leads the
and froze its assets, met the same fate.
charge of national security whistleblowers, but remains the only such
plaintiff to encounter the state secrets privilege. Other whistleblowers include: Coleen Rowley, one of Time magazine’s 2002 Persons of
216
the Year, who blasted the FBI for throwing up roadblocks in the in217
vestigation of Zacarias Moussaoui; Bogdan Dzakovic, a member of
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) “Red Team” who told the
September 11 Commission that the FAA knew before September 11th
that the nation’s commercial airplanes were vulnerable to hijack218
ings; Robert Wright, who alleged FBI intelligence agents thwarted
219
counterterrorism investigations in order to protect their sources;
John Vincent, an FBI agent who sued the Bureau after it forbade him
to talk to New York Times reporter Judith Miller about a bungled ter220
rorism investigation; Diane Kleiman, who alleges rampant corruption in the U.S. Customs Service and is suing for wrongful termina221
tion; and Russ Tice, an NSA analyst who was fired after going to
Capitol Hill with allegations that a Chinese spy worked with him at his
222
former post at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
Courts and commentators may shuffle the Arar, Global Relief
Fund, and no-fly list cases into the same category as the surveillance
cases (even though Arar alleges he was tortured in Syria!). The Ed215

Global Relief Fund, Inc. v. O’Neill, 205 F. Supp. 2d 885, 887 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
Amanda Ripley & Maggie Sieger, The Special Agent, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002/Jan. 6,
2003, at 34.
217
See Romesh Ratnesar & Michael Weisskopf, How the FBI Blew the Case: The Inside
Story of the FBI Whistle-Blower Who Accuses Her Bosses of Ignoring Warnings of 9/11. A
Reading of Her Entire Memo Suggests a Bracing Blueprint for Change, TIME, June 3, 2002, at
24.
218
See Bogdan Dzakovic, Statement to the National Commission on
Terrorist
Attacks
upon
the
United
States
(May
22,
2003),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/
030522-dzakovic.htm. Dzakovic also claims the FAA received a report on September
11 that one of the planes was hijacked with a firearm. Id.
219
Press Release, Judicial Watch, FBI Agent Robert Wright Says FBI Agents Assigned to Intelligence Operations Continue to Protect Terrorists from Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions (Sept. 11, 2002), http://www.judicialwatch.org/
printer_2469.shtml.
220
See Complaint, Vincent v. FBI, No. 03-0226 (GK) (D.D.C. June 17, 2004), available at http://www.judicialwatch.org/cases/110/complaint.htm.
221
Customs Coverup, http://www.customscoverup.com (last visited Aug. 28,
2006); Craig Horowitz, An Inconvenient Woman, NEW YORK, June 2, 2003, available at
http://newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/crimelaw/n_8740/.
222
James Ridgeway, Intelligence Whistleblower Canned, VILLAGE VOICE, May 4, 2005,
available
at
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0519,webmondo1,63748,6.html;
Rose, supra note 2, at 280.
216
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monds case and the particular brand of national security whistleblower
litigation that may follow, however, pose a unique challenge to the
viability of the Reynolds framework.
More than any other type of state secrets case, a national security
whistleblower case carries the possibility that the public interest in
disclosure, or at least allowing a case to go forward with judicial controls, outweighs the interest in secrecy. After all, in such a case a
plaintiff necessarily alleges government wrongdoing (either malfeasance or nonfeasance) that threatened or is threatening national se223
On the one hand the government may argue that military
curity.
or diplomatic secrets are at stake, but on the other hand are allegations that espionage rings and organized crime have infiltrated the
224
225
FBI, that terrorist investigations have been diverted, that massive
amounts of cocaine have been smuggled into the U.S. through cor226
227
ruption, and that foreign intelligence operates at the DIA.
Dismissing these cases may protect some aspects of national security, but
leave others extremely vulnerable.
IV.

EDMONDS V. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

228

A. Facts
Sibel Edmonds answered a call from the FBI, the week after the
September 11th attacks, to join the War on Terror as a contract lin229
guist. In time she found herself waging another war.
Edmonds was born in Turkey, raised in Iran, and attended col230
lege in the United States, where she has lived ever since.
She

223

See supra notes 26, 216–222, and discussion of Edmonds case infra at Part V.A.
See supra note 8; infra at Part V-A.
225
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
226
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
227
See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
228
Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 161 F.
App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005).
229
See Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 10, at 3. The 2005 complaint
(setting out Edmonds’ FTCA action against the federal government) arises from the
same set of facts underlying Edmonds’ suit under the Privacy Act, Administrative
Procedures Act, and First and Fifth Amendments, but is more specific than its predecessor. Compare Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8 with Edmonds 2002 Complaint, supra note 7.
230
Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 8, at 2; Rose, supra note 2, at 266–
67.
224
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speaks Turkish, Farsi, Azerbaijani, and English. She does not speak
232
Arabic.
233
Under constraint of gag orders, Edmonds alleges that as a contract linguist she was responsible for translating documents from the
target language into English, and occasionally the other way
234
around.
In her position she allegedly observed that a fellow translator in her department, Melek Can Dickerson, had improper con235
Dickerson, according to
tacts with subjects of FBI investigations.
Edmonds, translated wiretaps of these subjects and leaked informa236
tion to them.
Moreover, she instructed Edmonds not to translate
certain documents because she said she knew the subjects, and the
237
documents did not contain any pertinent information.
As a result,
documents and wiretaps relating to counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations were mistranslated and distorted, throwing
238
off the investigations. Furthermore, work order documents related
to the September 11th investigation were falsified and Edmonds’ sig239
Edmonds alleges that when she obnature was forged on them.
240
jected to these practices, Dickerson first attempted to bribe her and
241
then threatened her.
231
Horton, supra note 5. Edmonds’ FTCA complaint presents this by stating,
“[p]ublished media reports have stated that she is fluent in Turkish and Farsi, and
conversational in Azerbaijani.” Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 7, at 2.
232
Horton, supra note 5.
233
See Horton, supra note 5.
234
Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 11, at 3.
235
Id. ¶ 17, at 4.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id. at 5.
239
Id. For Edmonds’ description to September 11 Commissioner Thomas Kean
of Dickerson’s actions and their repercussions, see Letter from Sibel Edmonds to
Thomas Kean, Chairman, Nat’l Comm. on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S.
(Aug. 1, 2004), at 1–3 [hereinafter Kean Letter], http://www.justacitizen.com/
articles_documents/Letter_to_Kean.pdf.
In the letter Edmonds claims
that “Dickerson and several FBI targets of investigation left the United States in
2002 . . . .” Id. at 3.
240
Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 18, at 5–6. Allegedly Dickerson and
her husband, who had worked for years as a military attaché in Ankara, paid a surprise visit to Edmonds and her husband at their home. Id. The couple encouraged
them to join the American-Turkish Council, a prestigious and lucrative organization,
and intimated that all they would have to do to get in was tell the group Edmonds
worked for the FBI. Id.
241
Rose, supra note 2, at 273. Edmonds claims that about a month after the surprise visit, Dickerson told her she was endangering her family in Turkey. Id. (“According to Edmonds, [Dickerson said,] ‘Why are you doing this, Sibel? Why don’t
you just drop it? You know there could be serious consequences. Why put your family in Turkey in danger over this?’”). Edmonds alleges her sister fled Turkey for the
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Edmonds has hinted that she witnessed even more sordid practices during her time as a contract linguist, though apparently gag
242
orders keep her from elaborating.
Reportedly, she alleged to her
superiors that the translation department was covering up evidence
that foreign nationals had paid a State Department staffer in exchange for secrets, negotiated with a Pentagon official over weapons
procurement, discussed installation of spies at research facilities in
order to gain information regarding black-market nuclear weapons,
and referred in recordings to drug operations and money launder243
ing. Moreover, one author claims Edmonds listened to phone calls
in which targets spoke of attempting to bribe members of Congress of
244
both parties.
United States in early 2002 after Sibel warned her she was in danger. Edmonds 2005
Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 24, at 8. Edmonds further charges that beginning in late
2002, Turkish newspapers began running stories labeling her a spy and an enemy of
the Turkish state. Id. ¶¶ 55–63, at 14–16.
242
Rose, supra note 2, at 271–73, 280–81. Reporter David Rose apparently obtained information on the case from congressional staffers present during both Edmonds’ testimony and the FBI briefings at the secure Sensitive Compartmented Information facility. Id. (quoting congressional staffers). Edmonds says she is sure the
staffers based their tips “on the wiretap recordings they heard and the documents
[provided at the testimony and briefings].” Horton, supra note 5.
243
Rose, supra note 2, at 272. Reportedly Edmonds translated documents and
wiretaps relevant to an FBI investigation of Turkish nationals, particularly members
of the American-Turkish Council (hereinafter “ATC”) and targets inside the Turkish
embassy in Washington. Id.; Horton, supra note 5. During the course of the investigations a special agent who had already formed his own suspicions about Dickerson
directed Edmonds to go back and translate wiretaps which Dickerson had marked as
“not pertinent.” When Edmonds did so, according to Rose, she found information
relating to the secret payments and negotiations mentioned above. Rose, supra note
2, at 272; Horton, supra note 5.
244
Rose, supra note 2, at 281. In particular, the targets allegedly boasted about
making an illegal contribution of $500,000 to House Speaker Dennis Hastert in 2000
in order to get him to pull a resolution from the House floor which would have condemned Turkey for its alleged genocide of the Armenians. Id. at 281–82; Horton,
supra note 5. Supposedly there was an effort within the FBI to have a special prosecutor appointed to investigate the dealings with politicians, but nothing ever came
about, though the Campaign for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington has filed a
complaint requesting an investigation under federal election law as to whether
Hastert accepted illegal foreign funds. Rose, supra note 2, at 281; Campaign for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, CREW Files FEC Complaint Requesting Investigation into Foreign Donations to Rep. Dennis Hastert’s Campaign (Aug. 16, 2005),
http://www.citizensforethics.org/activities/campaign.php?view=80. As for the resolution supposedly pulled from the floor in 2000, the House International Relations
Committee passed two such resolutions in October 2005 condemning the Armenian
genocide. H.R. Res. 316, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Con. Res. 195, 109th Cong.
(2005); see also Press Release, Armenian National Committee of America, House International Relations Committee Overwhelmingly Adopts Armenian Genocide
Legislation
(Sept.
15,
2005),
http://www.anca.org/press_releases/
press_releases.php?prid=813. As it happens, ATC Chairman Scowcroft wrote Hastert
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The specifics of Edmonds’ journey through the official channels
of the FBI and Department of Justice are mostly undisputed. Starting
in January 2002, she told her story to the Supervisory Language Specialist, the Acting Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC), the FBI
Security Office, the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism
and Counterintelligence, the Deputy Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), and the Department of Justice Office of the In245
spector General (OIG).
The efforts were unavailing. Edmonds underwent a polygraph
examination administered to determine if she had made unauthor246
ized disclosures of information outside the Bureau, and passed.
247
Otherwise nothing came of her allegations.
In March 2002, with her complaints to the OPR and OIG still
248
pending, Edmonds was terminated. She claims that she was threatened with imprisonment as she was getting fired and that her superi249
ors told her the OPR and OIG would never take her case.
Moreover, she alleges that a month later the Turkish security service
executed a warrant at the home of her sister, who had already fled
250
the country.

a letter in September 2005 urging him to oppose the resolutions. Letter from Brent
Scowcroft, Chairman, American-Turkish Council, to Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the
House of Representatives (Sept. 12, 2005), http://www.anca.org/press_releases/
press_releases.php?prid=810.
245
Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8, ¶¶ 21, 23, 25, 30–31, at 6–9.
246
Id. ¶ 33, at 8–9.
247
Id. ¶ 17, at 5 (“FBI management failed to take corrective response to [Edmonds’] reports and serious concerns . . . .”).
248
See id. ¶ 38 at 10–11.
249
Id. ¶ 38 at 11. Specifically, Edmonds alleges Supervisory Special Agent Tom
Frields told her, in response to her vow that she’d see him again, “I will see you in
jail.” Id. Moreover, she claims that, after she mentioned the pending investigations,
Frields told her, “[w]e have already called them. OIG and OPR are not willing to
take your case and have told us that there will not be any investigation.” Edmonds,
2005 Complaint, supra note 8, at 11.
250
Id. ¶ 41, at 12. Supposedly the warrant read, “[f]or an important issue your
deposition/interrogation is required. If you do not report to the station within 5
days, between 09:00 and 17:00, as is required by Turkish law CMK.132, you will be
taken/arrested by force.” Rose, supra note 2, at 279. Edmonds later forwarded
through counsel a copy of the warrant to FBI Director Mueller and Attorney General
Ashcroft, along with a statement that she and her family were in danger. Edmonds
2005 Complaint ¶ 43, at 12.
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Edmonds soon attracted the attention of Senators Grassley and
251
Leahy, who expressed their concerns to Attorney General Ashcroft.
Over the next few years she gave testimony in a “secure Sensitive
Compartmented Information facility” to congressional staffers, OIG
252
Moreover,
investigators, and September 11 Commission staffers.
253
the FBI provided briefings to the same parties in the same facility.
B. Edmonds battles the state secrets privilege and classifications
Edmonds filed suit in the District Court for the District of Co254
255
lumbia on July 22, 2002, alleging violations of the Privacy Act,
256
Administrative Procedure Act, and First and Fifth Amendments of
257
On October 18, 2002 Attorney General
the U.S. Constitution.
258
Ashcroft invoked the state secrets privilege, touching off a battle of
transparency versus secrecy that spilled onto other fronts.
In April 2004, Ashcroft intervened in a case filed by certain September 11 families against Saudi Arabia and certain Saudi companies,
just as the plaintiffs were about to depose Edmonds, invoking the
259
privilege and moving the court to quash the deposition.
Later, in
May 2004, Ashcroft retroactively classified all Senate Judiciary Committee materials on Edmonds, including information on Leahy’s and
260
Grassley’s websites, an unprecedented move.

251

See Letter from U.S. Senators Charles E. Grassley and Patrick J. Leahy to John
Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Aug. 13, 2002), http://www.justacitizen.com/
articles_documents/Leahy_Grassley_Letter_to_Ashcroft_8-13-04.pdf.
252
Rose, supra note 2, at 266.
253
Id. at 271.
254
Edmonds 2002 Complaint, supra note 7.
255
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
256
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2000).
257
Edmonds 2002 Complaint, supra note 7. Edmonds sued for damages, reinstatement to her job, an order prohibiting the FBI from retaliating against her or her
family, and other injunctive relief. Id. Edmonds also filed a suit against the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). The court granted
summary judgment for the government on all but two of its claims of exemption
from providing documents. Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2003).
258
Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 73 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 161 F.
App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S, Ct. 734 (2005). The government also
moved to dismiss. Id. at 68.
259
Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 82, 82 (D.D.C. 2004).
260
Edmonds, Gagged, but Not Dead, supra note 1. The Justice Department
backed off of this position after the Project on Government Oversight filed suit.
Press Release, Project on Government Oversight, Justice Department Caves in: Allows
Publication of Retroactively Classified Information (Feb. 22, 2005),
http://www.pogo.org/p/government/ga-050202-classification.html.
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261

In July 2004, District Judge Walton upheld both the invocation
262
of the privilege in the Edmonds case and the motion to quash the
263
Edmonds had challenged the govdeposition in the Burnett case.
ernment’s invocation of the privilege in her case on the grounds that
Ashcroft did not personally consider the purportedly privileged ma264
265
The
terials and was not specific as to what should be privileged.
court rejected these arguments, first holding that the Attorney Gen266
eral met the personal consideration requirement. Relying on Kasza
267
v. Browner, the court reasoned that Ashcroft had expressed a level
of consideration similar to that of the Secretary of the Air Force in
268
that case, and the deputy director of the FBI supported his declara269
Turning to the specificity argument, the court stated that aftion.
ter reviewing several classified declarations in camera, it was satisfied
270
that Ashcroft had met this obligation.
Judge Walton, however,
added that he was unable to explain the basis of his decision, given
271
secrecy concerns.
Finally, the court held the case should be dismissed, reasoning that Edmonds would not be able to support any of
272
her claims. The court based its decision on further classified decla-

261

Judge Walton is currently presiding over the criminal case against I. Lewis
“Scooter” Libby, former Chief of Staff for Vice President Cheney, who was indicted in
October 2005 on charges of obstruction of justice, perjury, and making false statements. Kelli Arena et al., Cheney’s Top Aide Indicted; CIA Leak Probe Continues,
CNN.COM, Oct. 29, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/28/leak.probe/
index.html.
262
Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 73, 77.
263
Burnett, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 84. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Id.
264
Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
265
Id. at 75.
266
Id.
267
133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998).
268
Id. at 1168 (setting out statement of the Secretary of the Air Force).
269
Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
270
Id. at 76.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 79–82. Citing Kasza, the court set out three possible outcomes where the
state secrets privilege is successfully invoked:
First, by invoking the privilege over particular evidence, the evidence is
completely removed from the case. The plaintiff’s case then goes forward based on evidence not covered by the privilege. If, after further
proceedings, the plaintiff cannot prove the prima facie elements of her
claim with nonprivileged evidence, then the court may dismiss her
claim as it would with any plaintiff who cannot prove her case.
Alternatively, if the privilege deprives the defendant of information
that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim,
then the court may grant summary judgment to the defendant.
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rations that privileged materials could not be disentangled from non273
274
Judge Walton, quoting In re United States,
privileged materials.
wrote: “dismissal of a suit, and the consequent denial of a forum
without giving the plaintiff her day in court . . . is indeed draconian.
Denial of the forum provided under the Constitution for the resolution of disputes . . . is a drastic remedy that has rarely been in275
voked.”
The same day as the decision in Edmonds, Judge Walton partially
granted the government’s motion to quash Edmond’s deposition in
the Burnett case, throwing out nine of the plaintiffs’ eighteen pro276
posed questions. The court based its decision on the reasoning set
277
out in the Edmonds opinion. It also took the “mosaic” approach described above, positing that although certain questions seemed innocuous, privileged material would inevitably be disclosed during
278
cross-examination. Ultimately, the plaintiffs were permitted only to
ask Edmonds her name, when she came to the United States, the
level of her education, her first job out of school, whether she was
ever an employee of the federal government, when she worked for
the government, whether she still worked for the government, and
279
what her current employment was.

Finally, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s ability to produce nonprivileged
evidence, if the “very subject matter of the action” is a state secret, then
the court should dismiss the plaintiff’s action based solely on the invocation of the state secrets privilege. While dismissal of an action based
on the state secrets privilege is harsh, the results are harsh in either direction and the state secrets doctrine finds the greater public good—
ultimately the less harsh remedy—to bed dismissal.
Id. at 78 (quoting Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166–67).
273
Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 79–81.
274
872 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
275
Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (quoting In re United States, 872 F.2d at 477 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
276
Burnett, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 84; see also Posting of Dacha Dude to
http://homepage.mac.com/kaaawa/iblog/C177199123/E1350718859/index.html
(July 9, 2004, 11:09 EST) [hereinafter Permissible Questions for Edmonds].
277
Burnett, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 82–83.
278
Id.
279
Permissible Questions for Edmonds, supra note 276. The plaintiffs were not
allowed to ask Edmonds the following questions: “2) When and where were you
born?. . . 5) Where did you go to school? . . . .7) What did you focus your studies on
in school? 8) What languages do you speak? 9) What is your fluency or proficiency
in each of these languages? . . . 13) In what capacity have you been employed by the
United States government?” Id. The plaintiffs were also not allowed to ask Edmonds
a host of questions concerning the substance of her allegations set out in Grassley
and Leahy’s letter to Ashcroft. Id.
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That same month the OIG published its final report on the Edmonds matter, which Attorney General Ashcroft promptly classi280
fied. In January 2005, the OIG released an unclassified summary of
281
its report.
Though stating that a final determination as to
282
Dickerson’s alleged espionage was beyond the scope of the report,
it concluded that some of Edmonds’ claims were supported by evi283
dence.
Moreover, the OIG determined that the FBI could not
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
284
terminated Edmonds if not for her allegations, and the OIG further determined that the FBI’s overall investigation of her claims was
285
insufficient.
Finally, it recommended, among other things, that an
employee from the FBI Language Services Section (or a special
agent) interview each incoming contract linguist, that supervisors assign each translation assignment, that a uniform policy be adopted
for signing translation work orders, and that a system be installed to
286
track which linguists handle which materials.
In May 2005, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, in a
one-line opinion that did not cite any cases or provide a basis for de287
cision, the lower court’s decision in Edmonds.
The court took the
unusual step of announcing the day before oral argument that the
press would be barred from the proceeding, even though the gov288
Edmonds
ernment had already offered to argue the case publicly.

280

Edmonds, Gagged, but Not Dead, supra note 1.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF
OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S ACTIONS WITH ALLEGATIONS RAISED BY
CONTRACT LINGUIST, SIBEL EDMONDS, UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY (2005), [hereinafter
OIG Report], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0501/final.pdf.
282
Id. at 2. Dickerson was not named in the report.
283
Id. at 11 (“Edmonds’ assertions regarding the coworker, when viewed as a
whole, raised substantial questions and were supported by various pieces of evidence.”).
284
Id. at 30.
285
Id. at 34.
286
Id. at 32–34.
287
Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 734 (2005).
288
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Edmonds, 161 F. App’x 6, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(No. 05-190), available at http://www.justacitizen.com/articles_documents/
edmonds%20cert[1].%20petition.pdf. The government offered to argue the case
publicly on the assumption the courtroom would be cleared if the court wished to
ask questions concerning classified information. Id. at 47a. Instead, the court ordered the press barred altogether. Id. at 12–13. Edmonds urged the Supreme Court
to review this part of the case in addition to the state secrets privilege. Id. at 26–29;
see also Edmonds, Gagged but Not Dead, supra note 1 (“Numerous media related entities tried to flex their lately weakened muscles and filed their motion to oppose this
281
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filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in August 2005, which the Su289
preme Court denied in November 2005.
C. How Does the Edmonds Case Impact National Security?
Allegations of espionage and organized crime rings infiltrating
the FBI have an obvious nexus with national security. Yet Edmonds’
claims go even further than that. The missing link in this whole tale,
hinted at under constraint of gag orders, is its connection with Sep290
tember 11, articulated in her letter to September 11 Commissioner
291
Tom Kean. Edmonds alleges that both before and after the attacks,
292
information was intentionally withheld from special agents. Overall
Edmonds charges that:
Only one month after the catastrophic events of Sept. 11, while
many agents were working around the clock to obtain leads and
information, the bureaucratic administrators in the FBI’s largest
and most important translation unit were covering up their past
failures, blocking important leads and information, and jeopard293
izing ongoing terrorist investigations.

It must be emphasized that Edmonds’ allegations are just that,
allegations. Yet the OIG has concluded that her claims concerning
her coworker’s activities were “supported by various pieces of evi294
Moreover, the imposition of gag orders on her only begs
dence.”
the question: What is the government trying to hide?
Edmonds claims she can demonstrate that the actions of the
State Department prior to September 11 amounted to “a blunder of a
295
mammoth scale,” and that the excessive FBI secrecy in her case is
part of an effort to cover up epic missteps in the September 11 inves-

ruling. The judges denied their motion, and cited no reason; when asked for a reason they responded that they didn’t have to provide any reason.”).
289
126 S. Ct. 734 (2005).
290
Deliso, supra note 3; Horton, supra note 5; Kean Letter, supra note 239, at 1–7.
291
Kean Letter, supra note 239, at 1–7.
292
Id. at 3–7. Specifically, Edmonds claims that evidence gleaned from counterintelligence investigations which intersected with terror investigations was intentionally
blocked because it originated in certain countries with whom the State Department
did not wish to harm diplomatic relations. Id. at 7. She also alleges that after September 11 her supervisor intentionally withheld from a special agent translated
documents indicating that blueprints and other information on skyscrapers were being sent overseas prior to the attacks, as well as that visas were being illegally obtained
from certain Middle Eastern embassies. Id. at 6.
293
Id. at 6.
294
OIG Report, supra note 281, at 11.
295
Edmonds, Gagged, but Not Dead, supra note 1.
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296

tigation.
Furthermore, one author has argued that Attorney General Ashcroft primarily invoked the state secrets privilege in order to
protect the appointed officials who were implicated by Edmonds’ al297
legations.
As Edmonds has said, “[i]t is way past time for a little bit of criti298
cal thinking.”
In short, her allegations have everything to do with
299
national security. The walls of the secure Sensitive Compartmented
Information facility in which she testified can surely tell of what she
300
knows about bribery of public officials, black market nuclear trans301
actions, and moles in the FBI in league with suspected organized
302
criminals and terrorists.
As invocation of the state secrets privilege has thus far success303
fully crippled the Edmonds case, the question becomes: Should
countervailing national security interests be considered when the
government invokes the privilege in the name of the common good?
V. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
This Comment proposes that Congress pass a Rule of Evidence
mandating that where a national security whistleblower alleges gov304
ernment wrongdoing that has threatened or is threatening national
security, the state secrets privilege must be transformed into a qualified privilege in which the government faces a heightened standard
for successful invocation. In a case in which such facts are alleged, a
judge must evaluate any purportedly privileged materials in camera.
The judge must then balance the national security interests associated with the plaintiff’s claim against the government’s interest in
296
Sibel Edmonds, Where Is Accountability?, ANTIWAR.COM, June 21, 2005,
http://www.antiwar.com/edmonds/?articleid=6382.
297
Rose, supra note 2, at 281. The author claims a congressional staffer told him
this. Id.
298
Edmonds, Gagged, but Not Dead, supra note 1.
299
Representative Maloney called Edmonds’ testimony before a House committee
“absolutely and completely terrifying.” Edmonds Press Release 2, supra note 11.
300
See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
301
See Edmonds, Gagged but Not Dead, supra note 1; supra note 243 and accompanying text. Edmonds claims her allegations have to do with “a lot of illegal activities
that include multi-billion dollar drug-smuggling operations, [and] black-market nuclear sales to terrorists and unsavory regimes . . . .” Christopher Deliso, “The Stakes Are
Too High for Us to Stop Fighting Now”: An Interview with FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds,
ANTIWAR.COM, Aug. 15, 2005, http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=6934.
302
See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
303
Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 734 (2005); Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 79–82 (D.D.C. 2004).
304
Congress should define “wrongdoing” to include both nonfeasance and malfeasance.
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nondisclosure, and the government may only successfully resist discovery if it can demonstrate that disclosure—even in camera to merely
the litigant and counsel—presents a substantial possibility that national security will be endangered and outweighs the countervailing
national security interests asserted by plaintiff. A judge may interpret
Congress’s definitions of “whistleblower” and “national security” nar305
Moreover, the judge is to make use of in camera
rowly or broadly.
proceedings and protective orders as justice and national security require.
Furthermore, the Rule should feature certain procedural and
reporting requirements designed to balance the interests of the three
branches of government. First, there should be sanctions, civil and
criminal, in order to check frivolous claims, thus preventing plaintiffs
and counsel from wrongfully gaining access to sensitive informa306
tion.
Second, either the judge or the department head invoking
the privilege should have a duty to transmit all purportedly privileged
materials to ranking members of Congress possessing security clearances.
A. Other Proposals for Reform
The best-known, and most nearly successful, proposal to alter
307
the state secrets privilege was Proposed Rule 509.
As described
above, it mostly codified Reynolds, broadened it in some places, and
died at the hands of a Congress readying itself to take on President
308
Nixon.
Another approach to the privilege is reversion to the state of the
law before Reynolds. Though amorphous and vague, Justices Black,
Frankfurter, and Jackson in Reynolds favored the status quo in state
309
secrets cases. Specifically they agreed with the Third Circuit that
a claim of privilege against disclosing evidence relevant to the issues in a pending law suit involves a justiciable question, tradi-

305

Congress should define the term “whistleblower” to at least include “current or
former federal employees or civilians working under contract to the United States
who, to their detriment or personal risk, bring to light fraud, waste, and abuse in
government operations and agencies when such improprieties compromise the national security of the United States.” National Security Whistleblowers Coalition,
http://www.nswbc.org/purpose.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2006).
306
These sanctions, over and above Rule 11 sanctions, are intended to root out all
but the soundest claims where a plaintiff may gain access to secret information.
307
See supra Part III.B.
308
Id.
309
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson, Js., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying note 102.
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tionally within the competence of the courts, which is to be determined in accordance with the appropriate rules of evidence,
upon the submission of the documents in question to the judge
310
for his examination in camera.

The Third Circuit’s holding is in accord with the spirit of the
Rule this Comment proposes, but lacks specific procedural requirements that would make the state secrets privilege workable.
One commentator has proposed a comparative standard in as311
He argues that “[courts] should desessing all state secrets claims.
termine whether the danger from discovery conducted under conditions imposed by the court warrants withholding the information
312
Yet such an approach—balancing the
despite its disclosure value.”
parties’ interests regardless of the type of case a plaintiff brings—
departs from the underlying goal of the state secrets privilege, which
313
is protection of the common good. The approach presupposes that
the litigant’s need in any case should be balanced against the asserted
interests in nondisclosure, not contemplating that only in certain
cases will a comparative standard serve the public interest more than
an absolute privilege.
One commentator has proposed granting opposing counsel a
special Justice Department security clearance where disclosure would
harm the nation but the privileged material has the “strong potential
314
to aid the opposing party.” This is not the most efficient or realistic
315
approach, given how long clearances may take.
Again, the commentator proposes a comparative approach where the litigant can
316
show a requisite level of need. This Comment proposes a more focused approach designed to protect the very same national security
that the state secrets privilege itself strives to protect.
Another commentator urges the adoption of either of two pro317
posed statutes.
The first statute allows a plaintiff to recover damages, between a minimum of $1000 and a maximum of $250,000,

310

Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951).
The Military and State Secrets Privilege, supra note 27, at 584–86.
312
Id. at 584 (footnote omitted).
313
See generally supra note 21.
314
Brian M. Tomney, Note, 57 ME. L. REV. 641, 662 (2005).
315
For example, it takes the FBI six to nine months to process top secret security
clearances for state and local law enforcement. Security Clearance Process for State
and Local Law Enforcement, http://www.fbi.gov/clearance/securityclearance.htm
(last visited Aug. 22, 2006).
316
Id. (explaining the proposed standard would apply wherever privileged evidence has the “strong potential to aid the opposing party.”).
317
Gardner, supra note 142, at 568.
311
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where the invocation of the state secrets privilege has resulted in dismissal or has substantially affected the plaintiff’s case and where the
plaintiff can demonstrate a reasonable possibility that he or she
318
The second statute permits a
would have prevailed on the merits.
plaintiff, after successful invocation of the privilege, to petition the
department head invoking it for a settlement compensating him or
319
her, with leave to appeal to a State Secrets Compensation Board.
The proposals, while striving to address the interests of plaintiffs with
legitimate cases, have weaknesses. These weaknesses include the risk
320
of “graymail,” the unworkability of a standard requiring a judge at
the infancy of a case to determine whether there is a “reasonable pos321
sibility” of success on the merits, a compensation scheme which resembles a workers’ compensation scheme in its inability to make a
plaintiff whole, and a lack of equitable relief.
Another scholar contends that where the government asserts the
state secrets privilege, the statute of limitations for an action should
322
be tolled until there is no longer a need for secrecy. Yet an asserted
need for secrecy may linger until after a litigant is dead, as was the
323
case with the classified accident report in Reynolds.
Finally, two commentators argue that the state secrets privilege is
in tension with the constitutional order, particularly separation of
324
powers.
The Supreme Court, however, refused to treat the privi325
lege as a constitutional matter in Reynolds, and in its later encoun326
ters with the matter in Nixon and Tenet expressed no such concerns.
318

Id. at 602–03.
Id. at 606–07.
320
The Supreme Court has defined so-called "graymail" as the phenomenon of
bringing “individual lawsuits . . . to induce [an agency] to settle a case (or prevent its
filing) out of fear that any effort to litigate the action would reveal classified information that may undermine ongoing covert operations. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11
(2005). The low threshold required for compensation in Gardner’s proposed statutes leaves the government particularly vulnerable to graymail. Gardner, supra note
142, at 602–03, 606–07.
321
Gardner, supra note 142, at 602.
322
James Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REV. 875, 910 (1966).
323
See Herring v. United States, No. 03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18545 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126
S. Ct. 1909 (2006).
324
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 112 (arguing the privilege “threatens to
undermine the constitutional balance of power . . . .”); see also Reynolds v. United
States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951) (holding that to permit the executive to conclusively determine claims of privilege is to “unconstitutionally abdicate the judicial
function”).
325
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953).
326
See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974).
319
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In fact, in Nixon the Court hinted that Article II of the Constitution
requires some measure of deference to the Executive where military
327
and diplomatic secrets are concerned.
B. Advantages of This Proposal
The Rule this Comment proposes corrects a flaw in the current
state secrets privilege and otherwise leaves it intact, recognizing that
the prevailing interest at all times is that of the common good. At
present, the privilege fails to protect this common good where it
328
serves to halt a suit by a national security whistleblower.
This
Comment addresses this malfunction and harmonizes the interests of
the three branches of government.
By imposing a stricter standard on the government where a whistleblower alleges threats to national security, only the most direct and
serious of dangers to national security resulting from disclosure will
prevent such a plaintiff from having a fair day in court. In camera
proceedings and protective orders, where necessary, will preserve the
government’s interest in secrecy while allowing plaintiffs to seek
damages, reinstatement to their jobs, and restoration of their security
clearances. Reforming the state secrets privilege in this way will give
329
teeth to current statutory protections for whistleblowers, which currently are at the whim of the privilege as now interpreted. Overall
this will serve the common good by helping patriotic, vigilant citizens
to remain in their posts, free of retaliation, and report waste, fraud,
and threats to national security as they emerge. The Edmonds case illustrates just what a whistleblower may report and just what prospects
for relief he or she may hope to gain in the face of the state secrets
330
privilege.
The procedural requirements of the proposed Rule address the
needs of the three branches. Required in camera review of purportedly privileged materials has the advantages of putting the government to its proof, rooting out bad faith invocations of the privilege,
and familiarizing judges with the sort of evidence over which privi327

See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710 (“[President Nixon] does not place his claim of privilege on the ground they are military or diplomatic secrets. As to these areas of Art. II
duties the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities.”).
328
See supra Part IV.B.
329
FBI employees are not entitled to the protection of federal whistleblower statutes, but rather must seek redress internally. Geoffrey Gray, Code of Quiet, VILLAGE
VOICE, June 19–25, 2002, at 43. FBI whistleblower regulations currently do not offer
protection to contractors such as Edmonds. See 28 C.F.R. § 27 (2005).
330
See supra Part IV.B.
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lege is claimed so that the judiciary as a whole can begin forming a
more coherent approach to the privilege. In camera proceedings and
protective orders will accommodate the government’s need for secrecy.
Requiring either the judge or the Executive to transmit purportedly privileged materials to members of Congress with security clear331
ances may be the most novel aspect of this proposal.
It offers the
advantage of giving at least some members of Congress an idea as to
what materials the Executive is attempting to keep secret. From this
point there can be a dialogue as to Executive secrecy and its propriety. This requirement arms Congress with the tools to further refine
332
the state secrets privilege without having to “rule in a vacuum.”
Essentially, the aim of this proposal is to protect the national interest. As one dissenting court of appeals judge explained in a recent
commercial case upholding use of the privilege:
[P]ersons who serve the government must have a reasonable way
of resolving disputes. It is neither in the nation’s interest, nor can
it be the nation’s intention, to bar judicial relief when disputes
arise among persons who serve sensitive government business . . . .
The judicial obligation is to enable resolution, with safeguards
appropriate to the subject matter. Although there may be areas of
such sensitivity that no judicial exposure can be countenanced—
such as, perhaps, the formation of the Manhattan Project—there
is no suggestion that the sensitive information [at issue in this
case] can not be protected by well-established judicial procedures
for preserving the security of sensitive information . . . .
Trials in camera of issues subject to secrecy restraints are not
333
new . . . .

How would Edmonds play out under this proposed Rule? First, as
a threshold matter, or at any point during the proceedings, the judge
would have to determine whether her claims were frivolous. As long
as she was free of this stigma, the judge would review all purportedly
privileged materials. The national security interests associated with
Edmonds’ claims would be balanced against the government’s inter331
In 1998 Congress debated legislation which would have allowed “executive
branch employees to directly inform members of Congress or their staff representatives of waste, fraud, or violations of law by administrators.” Weaver & Pallitto, supra
note 14, at 107. The Justice Department objected to the legislation on separation of
powers grounds, and it never became law. Id. This Comment’s proposal differs in
that only members of Congress with security clearances would receive the information, thus rendering the intrusion on the Executive minimal.
332
Zagel, supra note 322, at 891.
333
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., 423 F.3d 1260, 1270–71 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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est in secrecy. That is, if she alleged terrorist investigations were
compromised by sympathizers in the translation department, then
the government would have to assert national security interests in secrecy which outweighed this; if she alleged black market nuclear activities, the government somehow would have to assert an interest in
secrecy which would outweigh that. If necessary all further proceedings would be in camera and subject to protective orders. All purportedly privileged materials would be transmitted to members of Congress with security clearances.
C. Arguments against this proposal
One issue facing this Rule is the scope and usefulness of its practical application. The state secrets privilege is a narrow area of evidence law, and whistleblower suits are a mere subset of state secrets
suits. Yet, after the September 11 attacks, there has been a flood of
national security whistleblowers alleging all sorts of wrongdoing
which contributed to the most bloody terrorist attack ever carried out
334
The emphasis should not be on the quantity of
on American soil.
suits, but rather on their magnitude. The proposed Rule strives to accommodate a class of litigants who allege wrongdoing which could
have implications for all Americans.
Another argument against this proposal is that balancing matters
335
It should be noted,
of national security may not be justiciable.
however, that in the present state secrets calculus this is precisely
what courts do, though with a significant measure of deference to the
336
Executive. Moreover, the proposed Rule invites congressional oversight and at all times guarantees the secrecy which the government
seeks.
It also can be argued that the political process will punish those
Presidents whose officers use the state secrets privilege to escape
blame for damage to national security. Yet excessive invocation of
337
the privilege, combined with gag orders on litigants and attempts to
338
gag members of Congress, stifles the political process before it can
even take place.
334

See supra notes 216–20 and accompanying text.
McCormick argues, where the privilege in question is not the state secrets privilege, that “judicial duties require an appraisal of private interests that must be reconciled with conflicting public policies. A judge may thus be better qualified than the
executive to weigh both interests and to strike a proper balance.” 1 MCCORMICK ET
AL., supra note 30, at 438.
336
See supra Part III.A.
337
See supra note 5.
338
See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
335
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Yet another possible criticism of this proposal is that it does not
go far enough. A strict interpretation of the proposed Rule would,
for example, leave the surveillance plaintiffs out in the cold. While it
is unacceptable that victims of constitutional violations may be without forums, this Comment does not dispute the basic tenet that the
common good must be preserved above all else, meaning some litigants’ claims cannot go forward. Under this proposal, however, a
judge is always free to interpret “whistleblower” or “national security”
broadly, meaning a plaintiff exposing a practice of warrantless surveillance could be a whistleblower, and a system of mass constitutional
violations could be held to threaten national security.
Still another criticism of this proposal is that in camera exposure
of privileged materials to judges, and transmission to select members
of Congress, could harm national security by diminishing the quality
of executive communications by revealing them to parties for whom
339
they were never intended.
Executive officers, so the argument
goes, will have a disincentive to pursue the ends of state if there is an
ever-present risk that they will be subject to judicial and congressional
scrutiny. Yet under this proposal, privileged materials will never be
340
There seems little
subjected to “curious and impertinent eyes.”
danger in exposing sensitive evidence to federal judges appointed by
341
the President and approved by the Senate.
Moreover, the only
members of Congress who will ever handle state secrets under this
proposal are those who have already been granted top secret clearance by the executive.
This leads to another argument against this proposal: if the danger to the executive is minimal, then all state secrets cases should be
governed by the provisions set out in this Comment, not just national
security whistleblower cases. There are two reasons why this argument is unavailing. First, some measure of deference is due to the
executive and the judiciary, and this proposal advocates a compromise position in recognition of this. Though it may seem palatable to
assail any claim of privilege which seems to have been made in bad
faith, judges thus far have seemed uneasy at the prospect of examin339

See supra note 130 and accompanying text, for Wigmore’s four conditions
which give rise to privilege and how they are intended to foster robust communications which the community prefers to be protected.
340
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 97 (citing the Trial of Maha Rajah Nundocomar, (1775) 20 State Trials 923, 1057 (Sup. Ct. of Judicature, Bengal)).
341
2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, at §§ 509–20 (“[D]isclosure in camera to
one federal district judge, whose appointment was ratified by the Senate itself, does
not threaten the national security more than disclosure to the employees of the executive agency who classified the information.”).
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ing materials which they do not feel are for their eyes.
Moreover,
the Supreme Court has cautioned that deference is owed to the Ex343
ecutive where state secrets are at stake. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, an important distinction must be made between state secrets cases in which plaintiffs’ allegations have a direct nexus with national security and those which, while adjudicating important rights,
feature an attenuated nexus. In the sort of national security whistleblower case which this proposal envisions, a plaintiff alleges that
344
waste, fraud, corruption, and the like have put lives in danger; thus
a departure from the typical state secrets rule is appropriate because
a whistleblower plaintiff permitted to pursue his or her claim can
help put an end to such practices. A plaintiff in another sort of state
secrets case, such as an employment discrimination case, does not allege that national security has been or is being directly threatened;
the same danger of revealing secrets remains, and there is much less
of a reason to depart from the Reynolds framework where the benefit
to the litigant does not also bring a benefit to national security.
Finally, one can argue that tinkering with the state secrets privilege in this way is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court hinted in
Nixon that the Constitution requires some deference to the Executive
345
where it seeks to protect military and domestic secrets.
Yet this
Comment leaves the state secrets privilege mostly intact and only alters it in an area in which it does more harm than good. Furthermore, there is a strong argument that the current state secrets privilege requires courts to unconstitutionally “abdicate the judicial
346
function.”
CONCLUSION
One unfortunate consequence of allegations like Edmonds’ is
that, uncontested for so long, they tend to calcify into cynicism towards government. Indeed, a 2004 Zogby poll revealed that half of
New York City residents believed that the government had foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks and consciously failed to
347
act.
Perhaps most disconcerting is that among those under thirty
342

See supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710–11 (1974).
344
For example, a plaintiff may allege that persons working for the FBI are abetting suspected terrorists.
345
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710.
346
See Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951).
347
Zogby International, Half of New Yorkers Believe US Leaders Had Foreknowledge of Impending 9-11 Attacks and “Consciously Failed” To Act (Aug. 30, 2004),
http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=855 [hereinafter Zogby Poll]. Ac343
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years of age, who in the decades to come will be inheriting the reigns
348
As President Carter once
of this republic, 62.8% held that view.
349
said, “if we despise our own government, we have no future.”
Over 13,000 individuals have signed Sibel Edmonds’ online peti350
tion seeking release of the classified OIG report. Members of Con351
gress have pledged support. And for her part, Edmonds has vowed
to soldier on:
In the past three years, I have been threatened; I have been
gagged several times; I have continuously been prevented from
pursuing my due process; all reports and investigations looking
into my case have been classified; and every governmental or investigative authority dealing with my case has been shut up. . . .
[But] for those of you who may think that since I have been
gagged and stopped by almost all available official channels, I
must be ready to vaporize into thin air, please think again. I am
352
gagged, but not dead; not yet.

Congress must reform the state secrets privilege, and it must begin to do so by protecting national security whistleblowers. No doctrine designed to protect the common good should be used as a
sword to strike down allegations that the common good is in danger.

cording to a July 2006 Scripps Howard/Ohio University poll, thirty-six percent of
Americans nationwide hold this view, including “a majority of young adults.” Thomas Hargrove, Third of Americans Suspect 9-11 Government Conspiracy, SCRIPPS NEWS,
http://www.scrippsnews.com/911poll (last visited August 2, 2006).
348
Zogby Poll, supra note 347.
349
Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter, 1 PUB. PAPERS 2 (Jan. 20, 1977).
350
Sibel Edmonds, Release of Classified DOJ-IG Report on FBI Cover-Up Petition,
http://www.petitiononline.com/deniz18/petition.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2006).
351
Edmonds Press Release 2, supra note 11.
352
Edmonds, Gagged, but Not Dead, supra note 1.

